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Abstract
A non-ad hoc, general theory of anthropic reasoning can be constructed
based on Bostrom[Bos02a]’s Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA)
that we should reason as if the current moment of our life were a randomly
selected member of some appropriate reference class of observer-moments.
We do not need to use anything other than standard conditionalization of
a hypothetical prior based upon the SSSA in order to estimate probabili-
ties. But we need to make the SSSA precise. We specify exactly what is
and what is not an observer, how to choose a reference class and how to
select a prior probability distribution that can be used when selecting ran-
domly from the reference class. There are both collective Dutch Book and
relative frequency arguments in favor of our rules for choosing priors and
reference classes. In order to handle examples like Bostrom’s[Bos02a]Lazy
Adam scenario, a causal anthropic decision theory is developed.
1 Introduction
Sometimes we care not just about which possible world1 is actual but also about
our temporal location or identity within the actual world. Even if I know for
sure which world is actual, if I have to make a decision, it might matter whether
I am George or Bill and whether the current time is noon or midnight.
We shall refer to reasoning about identity or temporal location2 as anthropic
reasoning or as reasoning about self-locating belief. We shall primarily be con-
cerned with anthropic reasoning in the presence of uncertainty (i.e. probabilistic
1There are many reasons not to be completely happy with the possible worlds formalism.
For example, set theoretic difficulties might arise[Kap95, Gri84]. But the possible worlds
formalism is convenient. So we shall refer to a universe of all possible worlds when we really
mean a set of equivalence classes of possible worlds. This set will not include all the worlds,
only the relevant worlds and we shall consider two worlds to be equivalent if the differences
between them are irrelevant. (What is interesting and what is relevant might be context-
dependent.) When we refer to the set of all possible worlds, we are really referring to a set of
competing hypotheses exactly one of which is true.
2I might reason about identity or temporal location either because I want to know who I
am or what time it is or because I might use my information about who I am or when I am
in order to help me estimate the probability that the actual world is a member of a certain
class of worlds.
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anthropic reasoning). We shall use the term “observer” to refer to something
that is capable of reasoning probabilistically about self-locating belief3.
Anthropic reasoning is ubiquitous and arguably necessary in both everyday
life and science[Bos02b, Sus06, Pag07] and there are many anthropic reasoning
scenarios that have relatively uncontroversial analyses, but there are other sce-
narios where anthropic reasoning might seem to lead to paradoxical or highly
counterintuitive conclusions or where it is not clear how we should estimate
probabilities[Bos02a, Elg00, Les92, Car83]. We would like to develop a general,
non-ad hoc theory of anthropic reasoning.
Bostrom[Bos02a] has already created a general theory of anthropic reasoning
based on the SSSA (Strong Self-Sampling Assumption). According to the SSSA,
we should reason as if the current moment of our existence were a randomly
selected element of some suitable reference class of observer-moments. It might
be simpler to apply the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA), which tells us to
reason as if we were a randomly selected observer. But observers believe different
things and know different things at different times in their lives, so we need the
SSSA.
In order to estimate posterior probabilities, we would like to be able to use
just the SSSA and standard conditionalization4.
We can develop a general Bayesian, non-ad hoc theory of anthropic reasoning
based on the SSSA and standard conditionalization. But in order to limit our
freedom to make arbitrary choices, we need to make the SSSA more precise.
We will also need to reinterpret standard conditionalization so that we are not
necessarily conditionalizing an actual chronologically prior distribution. We
might instead be conditionalizing a hypothetical prior. This hypothetical prior
might not take into account some of the knowledge that we actually do have
now and actually did have in the past[Mos09].
To say that we need to make the SSSA more precise is to say that we need
to know exactly what is and what is not an observer, we need to know how to
choose a suitable reference class of observer-moments, and we need to know how
to choose a prior for that reference class. It might be too difficult to construct
a truly general theory for selecting a prior so we shall assume that we have
available a general nonanthropic theory of Bayesian reasoning5 that allows us
to construct a prior probability distribution for (uncentered) possible worlds,
but we still need a theory to tell us how the prior probability that is given to a
certain possible world is distributed among the observer-moments in that world.
It is the goal of this paper to make the SSSA precise in such a way that it
is possible to construct a general theory of nonanthropic reasoning.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows: In section 2.1, we
3A more precise definition of observer will be provided in section 7 of this paper.
4Various generalizations and modifications to standard conditionalization have been
proposed[Tit07, Mea08b, Hal04] but since standard conditionalization seems to work fairly
well for nonanthropic scenarios, we might like to also use standard conditionalization in the
anthropic case.
5One might well doubt whether we can necessarily always separate the nonanthropic and
anthropic parts of the problem of choosing a prior but it is a convenient simplifying assumption.
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present our centered possible worlds formalism and introduce some notation.
Many of our arguments are wagering arguments. In section 2.2, we discuss when
and why we should be convinced by wagering or decision-theoretic arguments.
Before describing our theory in complete generality, we find it useful to
present some troubling anthropic reasoning scenarios. It is easier to explain the
general theory if we have these scenarios available to use as illustrative examples.
Section 3 contains a detailed analysis of the Doomsday Argument[Car83, Les92]
scenario and why anthropic reasoning can lead to apparently paradoxical or
at least counter-intuitive results. Section 4 is about the Sleeping Beauty[Elg00]
scenario and section 5 discusses why we need to use anthropic reasoning if we are
to link cosmology with observation[Bos02b]. There is a strong analogy between
the scenario of section 5 and the Sleeping Beauty and Doomsday Argument
scenarios. It is difficult to see how we can accept the use of anthropic reasoning in
order to link cosmology with observation and yet not apply anthropic reasoning
to the scenarios of section 4 and section 3 (and thus it is difficult to see how we
can avoid the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument).
Section 6 describes another simple scenario. In this scenario we know which
world is the actual world, but we have to estimate how likely it is that we are
Al rather than a duplicate of Al. Al and the duplicate are in the exact same
subjective psychological state but it is harder than it might seem to establish
that we are just as likely to be Al as Al’s duplicate.
Sections 7, 8, and 9 tell us how we should choose a prior. Thus we need to
choose a reference class (section 9) and there are both relative frequency and
collective Dutch Book arguments in favor of choosing almost maximal reference
classes. We might like to say include all observer-moments in the reference class,
but we cannot do that. If i and j are two different observer-moments and what
j believes or how j makes decisions is constrained by what i believes or the
decisions i makes, then i and j might not truly be distinct and independent
observer-moments. It is not a problem if in practice j will have often almost
the same beliefs as i but it is a problem if j would have almost the same beliefs
as i even if it were exposed to quite different evidence or if it were impossible
to expose i and j to very different evidence. We should want reference classes
to be maximal classes of approximately independent observer-moments.
Section 7 explains why an observer-moment is just something that can sen-
sibly be modelled as being capable of probabilistic anthropic reasoning. This
modelling might involve a limited amount of idealization. It also needs to be
kept in mind that an observer might be capable of reasoning about certain issues
(certain universes of possible worlds) and not others and therefore something
might be considered an observer with respect to certain issues but not others.
Section 8 analyzes how we might put a prior probability measure on a ref-
erence class of observer-moments. We restrict attention to the case where the
reference class is finite and show why we might want to let the prior probabili-
ties for the observer-moments in any given possible world be proportional to the
amount of information that the observer-moments are capable of representing.
In section 10, there is a short description of how the case where the reference
class is infinite might be handled by expressing infinite scenarios as limit of finite
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scenarios. The problem is it is not clear how that should be done. We might
have to learn from experience how to handle the infinite case. In fact, since
the general theory of anthropic reasoning presented in this paper is not (even
in the finite case) the only possible plausible theory and our arguments in favor
of our theory are not incontrovertible, we might have to learn from experience
which theory of anthropic reasoning is best to apply. But there is no question
of not applying some theory of anthropic reasoning. Learning from experience
which theory to apply is just standard application of Bayes’ rule (section 11) or
standard empirical Bayes[CL00].
Section 12 analyzes why we can often arrive at correct results even if we do
not distinguish between the different observer-moments belonging to the same
observer or even distinguish between the different observers in a given possi-
ble world. Thus section 12 tells us why many probabilistic reasoning problems
do not require us to use anthropic methods and even problems that do re-
quire anthropic reasoning need not require that we distinguish between different
observer-moments belonging to the same observer. This section also discusses
why in problems like Sleeping Beauty we often do not care about irrelevant fine
details of the subjective psychological states of observers.
Section 13 contains a sketch of an anthropic causal decision theory and
section 14 presents a conclusion and suggestions for future research.
2 Formalism and Notation
2.1 Centered Possible Worlds
We use the concept of centered possible world[Lew79]. A centered world is
an ordered pair consisting of a possible world and a center. A center might be
thought of as a perspective from which we are viewing a world. If c is something
that exists in the world w, then (w, c) is a centered possible world. But we are
primarily interested in the case where the center c is an observer-moment.
In much of our discussion an observer-moment will be an ordered pair con-
sisting of an observer o and a time interval t6 during which o is an observer.
But if one has to split an observer into parts, it might not be only temporal
parts that are of interest to us. We might view a human observer as consisting
of several different subpersonalities with different beliefs and desires. So we
might consider each subpersonality as a separate observer-moment or consider
observer-moments consisting of a subpersonality during a certain time-interval.
We want to refer to THE universe of possible worlds7 but we cannot assume
that every observer-moment z8 is working with the same universe. Our decision-
theoretic arguments and wagering arguments (including collective Dutch Book
6That time interval might just be a single point in time.
7actually the set of interesting equivalence classes of possible worlds
8Here we refer to observer-moment z but what is really meant is centered-world z. Thus
we really are referring to a particular observer-moment in a particular world, but it is more
natural and more convenient to talk about the beliefs and decisions of observer-moments
rather than of centered-worlds.
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arguments) and relative frequency arguments make most sense if we can rea-
sonably model our observer-moments as being perfectly rational or at least as
being capable of being perfectly rational. There is some idealization involved in
modelling observer-moments as being perfectly rational but we do not wish to
idealize too much. We might imagine a certain observer-moment as being capa-
ble of having coherent beliefs about some issues and not other issues and such
an observer would be able to construct a coherent and reasonable probability
distribution for certain universes of possible worlds and not others.
So for each observer-moment z, there is a universe Wz of possible worlds.
As far as z is concerned, there might exist possible worlds outside of Wz but
either z thinks they have zero probability of being actual9 or z is incapable of
reasoning coherently about these other worlds so that if w ∈ Wz, z will not
really tells us her probability estimate for w being actual, only the conditional
probabilty of w being actual given that the actual world lies in Wz. If w ∈Wz,
w is really an equivalence class of possible worlds; either z does not care about
the differences between the different worlds in the equivalence class w or z has
difficulty reasoning coherently about the differences.
In much of our discussion we will refer to W rather than Wz because we
will only be concerned with a single universe, but in general different observer-
moments can work with different universes. So we let W be a universe of possible
worlds of interest to us and let W∗ be the set of all centered possible worlds of
interest to us. We assume that each z ∈ W∗ is a world of the form (w, c) with
w ∈ W and that for all w ∈ W , there exists a z ∈ W∗ of the form (w, c). In
general if A ⊆W , we will use A∗ to represent the set of z ∈W∗ such that there
exists w ∈ A with z = (w, c) for some center c. Thus A∗ is the set of centered
worlds in W∗ that are obtained by pairing a world in A with a center. If A is
a singleton set {w}, we shall write w∗ instead of {w}∗.
We assume that all z ∈W∗ have available to them a theory of nonanthropic
reasoning that will make it possible for them to construct a nonanthropic prior
P for W . All z ∈W∗ are assumed to use the same nonanthropic prior.
To say that P is nonanthropic is to say that no anthropic information was
used either directly or indirectly to obtain P 10. If for all z ∈ W∗ knows, the
world w might be the actual world and x ∈ w∗, z’s nonanthropic prior should
not take into account any information that z has and x does not have or that
x has and z does not have. If any such information is taken into account, then
the nonanthropic prior is not really nonanthropic. Thus x and z should use the
same prior. It is convenient for us to also require that x and z use the same
nonanthropic prior even if x ∈ w∗ and z knows for sure that w is not actual; we
9But we might need to discuss some of these zero probability worlds when considering
counterfactual possibilities.
10Many discussions in the literature of anthropic reasoning do not take sufficient account of
the possibility of indirect use of anthropic information. If some observers have made more ob-
servations than other observers in the same world, they might know more than other observers
about which world is actual and they might have a more sophisticated physics. If they use
this more sophisticated physics to construct their nonanthropic priors, then this nonanthropic
prior is not truly nonanthropic. It might actually be difficult to construct a truly nonanthropic
prior.
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might be interested in how z would reason if she did not know that w was not
actual.
Given z ∈ W∗ and A ⊂ W∗, we need to say how z should compute a
posterior probability estimate for A. This estimate would quantify how likely z
thinks it is that she belongs to the set A.
First z needs to take her nonanthropic prior P and use P to build an an-
thropic prior. That requires that a reference class Rz be chosen. This is the
suitable reference class of observer-moments referred to in the SSSA. Then it
is necessary for z to reason as if she were a randomly chosen element of Rz.
The random selection presupposes that we can define for every A ⊂ Rz, the
probability that the randomly chosen element of Rz will actually belong to A.
Thus we assume that z can construct a prior probability distribution Pz on
Rz. This prior needs to be conditionalized on the knowledge Kz that z actually
does have. So what z really needs to do is compute the conditional probability
Pz(A|Kz).
The probability distribution Pz must be consistent with P and that means
that if V ⊂ W , then Pz(V ∗ ∩Rz) = P (V ). The real problem is how should
z apportion among the various x ∈ w∗, the prior probability z gives to some
world w ∈W .
At this point we need to say a little more about the Kz, the knowledge
states, on which we conditionalize the prior Pz. When considering what an
observer-moment knows, we assume that observer-moments have available to
them a complete description of every element of W∗ and of every element of
W 11. We also assume that observer-moments are perfectly rational (at least
when reasoning about W∗) and that if they know some proposition p, then they
know that they know p and if they do not know p, then they know that they do
not know that p. (This assumption really only need be true if p is a proposition
about where some observer-moment lies in the set W∗. and here by knowing p,
we might only mean believing that p is certain to be true12.)
Given our assumptions and the fact that Kz will be knowledge about which
world in W is actual, knowledge about z’s identity, and knowledge about the
current time, we can let Kz be the set of y such that for all z knows, she might
be y13.
11Observer-moments know everything about all the possible worlds except they might not
know which world is actual and they know everything about all observers except they may
not know which observer they are and what the current time is.
12Only if p is certain to be true can it be necessarily safe to conditionalize on p.
13When conditionalizing, z does has to take into account that she knows of certain observer-
moments y, that she could not possibly be y. She has to take into account the set Kz . But
she does not have to also take into account the set of y in W∗ that are such that for all she
might conceivably be y but is very unlikely to be y. Jeffrey conditionalization is not necessary.
If she is not sure whether she is y but thinks it very unlikely that she is y or if she is not
sure if she is y but thinks much more likely that she is x, then since she is not sure if she is
y, she might y. Thus y also thinks it unlikely that she is y and perhaps thinks it much more
likely that she is x. In order for z to take into account her knowledge that she is unlikely to
be y, she cannot conditionalize on the proposition that she is not y because she might be y.
It suffices to conditionalize on the information that she is an observer-moment who believes
that she is unlikely to be y (and perhaps much more likely to be x).
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There is more we can say about the knowledge state Kz. Let y, z ∈W∗ and
Ky 6= Kz. The observer-moment z knows what she knows and what she does
not know and she has available a complete description of what y knows and
thus she knows what she knows is not the same as what y knows. So z knows
she cannot be y. So y ∈ Kz if and only if y and z are in the same knowledge
state.
If Ky = Kz, we might say that y and z are in the same subjective psycho-
logical state. Technically, they do not actually have to be in the same state.
It suffices that any difference in their states will not affect how they reason
about their location within W∗. It might seem that in the actual world, here on
Earth, there do not exist two distinct observer-moments that are in the exact
same subjective psychological state. So we might find it remarkable if Ky = Kz
and y and z both exist in the same possible world. There must be something
in the local environment of y that is different from the local environment of z.
So y and z will not be observering exactly the same thing. If one takes into
account things like a fly crawling up a wall or a pattern of movements of tree
branches while the wind blows or some other minor details, it might seem that
y and z will be perceiving different things[Nea06]. But even if they do actually
perceive different things, not every little thing that is perceived is actually ap-
prehended, not everything perceived at the fringes of awareness is truly taken
in. So even if y and z are in subjectively different psychological states, they
might not be able to take advantage of this difference when they reason about
who they are in within W∗. If someone were to call to an observer-moment’s
attention something at the periphery of her awareness, she would be able to
use that information. But Kz refers to the information that z actually does
have and is actually able to make use of when reasoning and making rational
decisions such as decisions whether or not to accept or reject a certain wager.
2.2 On Wagering and Decision-Theoretic Arguments
Many of the arguments of this paper are wagering arguments. We start (2.2.1)
by discussing wagering arguments in general and why they might be convincing.
Then (2.2.2), we analyze why we might want to maximize expected total or
expected average utility. In (2.2.3), we formally define the kind of wagers of
most interest to us.
2.2.1 Why Care About Wagers?
Observer-moments are offered a chance to accept or reject wagers. All observer-
moments are assumed to want to maximize their expected monetary return and
choose to accept or reject a wager accordingly. In order to compute expected
return, they will use posterior probabilities that will have been computed with
the help of some theory of anthropic reasoning. If the consequences of observer-
moments adopting a certain theory of anthropic reasoning and using that theory
to choose whether or not to accept certain offers to wager are intuitively un-
acceptable, then perhaps there is something wrong with that theory especially
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if there would be no such undesirable consequences if some other theory of
anthropic reasoning were applied[Hit04, DP08, Bri10].
Wagering arguments are vivid but they have many problems[BL06]: If a
bookie offers to bet with you, how can you be sure that she will actually pay
you if you win? How do you know that the mere fact that you were or were not
offered a certain wager is not useful information that should influence your deci-
sion whether or not to accept the wager; maybe the bookie knows more than you
do and will take advantage of that knowledge to offer you a wager that seems
very appealing but really is not? Why should one try to maximize expected
monetary return? Maybe the thrill or anxiety associated with uncertainty mat-
ters. Utility is not necessary a linear function of money. Additional problems
for our arguments arise if the bookie herself is considered to be an observer
(rather than some kind of automaton); we do not want observer-moments to
modify their probability estimates to take into account the fact that they know
that they are not the bookie.
Some of these problems vanish if we view wagering arguments as really be-
ing arguments about decisions and maximizing expected utility. But the one
advantage money has over units of utility is that money is transferable and it
makes sense to add up the monetary returns of George and Bill14. It is not so
obvious it makes sense to add their utilities.
It might makes sense to add the utilities of Bill and George. The real problem
is that utilities are only defined up to a positive linear transformation[vNM44].
So if you multiply George or Bill’s utility functions by 3, the decisions he will
make will not change. So how do you know how to scale Bill’s and George’s
utility function so that it makes sense to add their utilities? You can ask yourself
this question: “If in some actual or hypothetical world I did not know whether I
was Bill or George but believed myself as likely to be Bill as George and I were
offered a chance to perform an action resulting in a net gain of one unit of utility
for Bill and a net loss of one unit for George, would I perform the action?” If
the answer is yes, then one unit of Bill’s utility is worth at least as much as
one unit of George’s. Additional questions can be asked to help us determine
the exact conversion factor between Bill utility and George utility[Har55]. Our
wagering arguments do not really require that we actually solve the problem
of comparing utilities of different observer-moments. They just require that a
solution exists.
In practice, if George really did not know whether he was George or Bill, he
would probably. have to be able to compare the utilities of Bill and George in
order to know how to make decisions. More generally, we might have x, y ∈ Kz
and x 6= y and z might have to make a decision that has different effects on
the utilities of x and y. So z should be able to compare the utilities of x and
y. Even if George knows he is not Bill and that the current time is noon and
14However, we might still wonder why we care about maximizing the total expected return
of Bill and George. George might only care about George and Bill might only care about Bill.
Who is to say that the best thing to do is to maximize the expected return of Bill plus the
expected return of George rather than the expected return of Bill plus twice the return of
George. Maybe George needs money more or belongs to a higher caste.
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not midnight, he might be able to imagine being ignorant of what time it is
and whether he is George or Bill. If he truly can imagine this ignorance, he
should be able to imagine making a decision which affects differently his utility
depending on what time it is and whether he is Bill or George. He will need to
make tradeoffs and compare utilities to know how best to act. So we will accept
the legitimacy of adding the utilities of different observer-moments.
Thus it might make sense to analyze the expected total return (summed up
over all observer-moments) or expected average return that observer-moments
obtain in a wagering scenario. The question still needs to be asked: Should we
care about maximizing expected total utility and should we care about maxi-
mizing average expected utility?
2.2.2 Should We Care about Total Utility, Average Utility, or Nei-
ther?
Now that we have seen that we can meaningfully add utilities, the question
arises should we try to maximized expected total or expected average utilities.
The utilities in question might be epistemic utilities if one imagines observer-
moments as being in the position of choosing a posterior probability distribution.
Observer-moments want to maximize accuracy; for any given z ∈ W∗, the
greater the posterior probability z grants to the proposition she is observer-
moment z, the greater the accuracy of her probability estimate. There is a
standard way to measure accuracy for a single observer-moment using the Brier
score[KM05]. But it does not matter how we measure inaccuracy for a single
observer-moment as long as there is a well-motivated measure that lets us attach
a utility value to a degree of epistemic inaccuracy.
But however we obtain the utility values for single observer-moments, we
still need to know how to combine the utilities of different observer-moments.
We will come to different conclusions as to how certain anthropic reasoning
scenarios should be analyzed depending on whether we add up or average the
utilities of the observer-moments in each world[KM05].
First consider why we might want to average utilities. The basic reason is
that we believe the SSSA. If we are some observer-moment z ∈ W∗ and are
really reasoning as if we were an observer-moment randomly selected from the
reference Rz and Rz = W∗ and we do not take into account any knowledge
we actually have of our identity (we do not take into account Kz), then we
would want to maximize
∑
y∈W∗ Pz(y)U(y) where U(y) represents the utility of
observer-moment y and Pz(y) is the probability that when selecting randomly
we would select y. Assume all utilities are finite and that the set W∗ is finite
so that we do not have to worry about infinities. Then
∑
y∈W∗ Pz(y)U(y) =∑
w∈W P (w)
∑
y∈w∗ Pz(y|w∗)U(y) and here Pz(y|w∗)U(y) is a weighted average
of the utilities of the observer-moments in w. We are thus trying to maximize
the expected value (if we pick a world w at random) of a weighted average of
utilities. But we were wondering why we should try to maximize the expected
value of an ordinary, unweighted average.
If we could show that Pz(y) should have the same value for all observer-
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moments y who live in the same possible world, then we would be done. But we
might doubt that observer-moments (or observers) in the same possible-world
should be equally likely to be chosen by our random selection process. We
want to use wagering or decision theoretic arguments including epistemic utility
arguments to help us choose how to distribute the probability P (w) among
the observer-moments in w∗. So when analyzing wagers we cannot necessarily
simply assume that we should try to optimize expected average utility.
We might also want to prefer theories that when believed in by all observers
result in maximizing
∑
w∈W P (w)
∑
y∈w∗ U(y). Since we are assuming the util-
ity functions of the different observer-moments have been properly scaled, we
should believe that someone who cares equally about the utility of all observer-
moments in the actual world would want to maximize the expected total util-
ity15. If instead of utility, U(z) for z ∈ W∗ measures monetary return and
all observer-moments want to maximize total monetary return (something not
implausible to an economist who is concerned about total real gross national
product), then maximizing
∑
w∈W P (w)
∑
y∈w∗ U(y) makes sense. There are
many plausible assumptions under which all observer-moments would prefer
that all observer-moments use theory A rather than B if A results in greater
expected total return.
The problem is that decisions are not made by a committee of all observer-
moments in a given possible world16. They are made individually by each
observer-moment. Every observer-moment might have to make a choice be-
tween theory of anthropic reasoning A and theory B and it might be better17
if everyone used theory A rather than everyone using theory B but it might
be still better if everyone except one observer-moment in each possible world
(and it does not matter which observer-moment) used theory A and that one
observer-moment used theory B.
We might view choosing a theory of anthropic reasoning (i.e. choosing the
reference class and a probability distribution to use to guide the selection of
a random element from the class) as a game. In this game, every observer-
moment might have the goal of maximizing expected total utility or expected
average utility or there might be some other common goal. But we require that
15If there are two observer-moment in the world who each have two units of utility, it
hardly damages the other two observer-moments if their utilities are kept constant but another
observer-moment is created with only one unit of utility. So an impartial benefactor would
prefer to maximize the expected sum not average. This might be controversial but it is at
least a reasonable possibility.
16Nor are decisions made by a committee consisting of all the observer-moments belonging
to a given observer. Yes, George at eleven might make a decision to spend all his money
and that might prevent George at twelve from gambling at all or George at eleven might
find a way to force George at twelve to make decisions in a certain way, but if that happen,
then George at twelve is not really making certain decisions; George at eleven is making the
decisions. Especially if we are dealing with a scenario involving infinities, it might useful
for some observer-moments to bind other observer-moments[AEH04] (force them to make
decisions in a certain way). But each observer-moment that is actually making a decisions is
making her own decision.
17Better meaning greater expected total utility or greater expected total monetary return
summed up over all observer-moments.
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every solution to this game be a Nash equilibrium. If our solution says that
all observer-moments should choose A, our solution is not acceptable if any
observer-moment finds it rational to defect from the solution.
2.2.3 Formalizing Wagers
It is now necessary to formally specify the kind of wagers of interest to us.
Let W be the universe of possible worlds of interest to us and let W∗ be
the set of centered worlds of interest to us. Then by definition a wager is a
map f from W∗ to R, the real numbers. If z ∈ W∗, then f(z) is the utility
gained by z when she accepts rather than rejects the wager. We are assuming
that the amount gained by z by accepting rather than rejecting is independent
of what the other observer-moments do and independent of any wagers other
than f that might be offered. We can deal with a wager f that is really offered
to only a few of the observer-moments by setting f(z) = 0 for any z who is not
really offered a chance to wager. So there is no loss of generality in assuming
the domain of f is all W∗.
All observer-moments have the same information about the wager f and
they are all offered the same choice to accept or reject the wager. Thus no
information can be obtained from the fact that one is offered a certain wager.
The same wager is offered in all worlds w ∈W to all w∗.
Wagers are only one kind of decision-theoretic problem, but they are general
enough for most of our purposes18. A wager is really just a choice between two
actions, a choice which is offered (at least in principles) to all observer-moments.
The choice need not be a choice with material rewards. It could be a choice
between two (probabilistic) beliefs. Here observer-moments would be trying to
maximize expected epistemic utility.
Wagers should not be thought of as necessarily taking place in any world
w ∈ W . In fact, all worlds in W might be such that certain decision problems
do not arise. And even if a certain decision problem did arise in the world w,
observer-moments are perfectly rational and do not make irrational choices, but
we might want to discuss what would happen if they did make an irrational
choice. So we need to realize that wagers might take place in worlds outside of
W .
.
3 The Doomsday Argument Scenario
In this section, we discuss in detail a simple version of the Doomsday Argument
scenario[Car83, Les92] and its unfortunate conclusion (section 3.1). It appears
that if we believe the Doomsday Argument we will make bad decisions. It
might seem that we can avoid the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument if
we apply the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) (section 3.2), but the SIA is
18They are not general enough to deal with the case where a decision affects the number of
observers who exist in the world.
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not adequately motivated and can also lead to strange conclusions. Another
approach is to use minimal reference classes (section 3.3) so that Rz = Kz for
all z ∈W∗ but that would allow us to be Dutch Booked and does not allow us
to make proper use of anthropic information we really do have.
In a simple version of the Doomsday Argument scenari there are only two
possible worlds, Doom Soon and Doom Later. These are very similar possible
worlds and if we did not take into account anthropic considerations, we would
have no reason to think one of these two worlds more likely than the other world.
We might think that we have a good nonanthropic justification for giving Doom
Soon a prior probability of 0.5.
The two worlds, Doom Soon and Doom World, might be equally likely a
priori to be actual and also be very similar but there is one big difference between
them. Only M observers exist in Doom Soon but N > M > 0 observers exist
in Doom Later. Here by exist is meant exist now, have existed in the past or
will exist in the future.
In order to specify an observer, we can mention her birth rank. An observer
o is said to have rank i if the number of observers born before o is exactly i− 1.
An observer is said to be born at the instant it first becomes an observer19
We shall make some idealizations and model all observers in both possible
worlds as consisting of exactly two observer-moments. If o1 and o2 are two
different observers in the same possible world, the first moment of o1 might live
during a very different time-interval than the first moment of o2, but if o is an
observer in a possible world w, it is convenient to use the notation (w, o, 0) to
represent the first moment of observer o in world w and (w, o, 1) will represent
the second moment.
All observers begin life totally ignorant of which observer they are and which
world they live in. Thus if F represents the set of all observer-moments that
are the first moment of some observer, we have Kz = F for any z ∈ F . But if
z 6∈ F , then z knows her exact birth rank i. If i > M , then z is high rank and
z knows the actual world is Doom Later. The question is what should z believe
about the likelihood of Doom Soon if i ≤M and z is low rank.
We assume that the relevant reference class will be the class of all observer-
moments. We assume that there exists a constant k such that Pz(w, (o, 0)) =
kPz(w, (o, 1)) for any z ∈ W∗ and any w ∈ W (i.e. the ratio between the
prior probabilities of (w, (o, 0)) and (w, (o, 1)) is the same for all observers and
worlds)20. For most of our analysis there will be no loss of generality in assuming
that k = 1. What matters is that merely learning whether or not we are
an observer-moment who knows her birth rank gives us no information about
whether Doom Soon or Doom Later is actual.21 We also assume that for any
19We assume there are no ties or ambiguities. So there cannot be two different observers in
the same world with the same birth rank.
20Notice that if k = 0, then we can, for most purposes, ignore observer-moments who do
not know their birth rank.
21If we know that we know our birth rank, then we know our birth rank and this knowledge
will be greatly relevant to estimating the probability of Doom Soon but the mere fact that we
know that we know our birth rank tells us nothing about whether Doom Soon is actual.
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given world w and any two observers o1 and o2 in w, there is no reason to give
more prior probability to o1 than to o2.
Let z be an observer-moment who knows she is low rank (let that rank
equal j) and wants to estimate Pz(Doom Soon|Kz), the probability that she is
an observer-moment in Doom Soon. Pz(Doom Soon|Kz) = Pz(Doom Soon∩Kz)Pz(Kz)
but Pz(Kz) is the prior probability of having rank j and knowing that one has
rank j. And that probability is .5( 1k+1 )(
1
M ) + .5(
1
k+1 )(
1
N ) since the probability
that a random observer in Doom Soon has rank j is 1M and in Doom Later the
corresponding probability is 1N while in either Doom Soon or Doom Later the
probability of a random observer-moment of rank j knowing her birth rank is
1
k+1 and the probability of Doom Soon (and of Doom Later) is .5.
The probability Pz(Doom Soon ∩Kz) is the probability that a random ob-
server moment lives in Doom Soon and knows she has rank j and that prob-
ability is just .5( 1k+1 )(
1
M ). Thus the posterior probability of Doom Soon is
1
M
1
M+
1
N
= NM+N . So the posterior probability of Doom Later is
M
M+N . If
N
M is
very large, then Doom Soon would seem to be nearly certain to be actual. This
conclusion that Doom Soon is nearly certain is highly problematic for several
reasons. But the basic reason is that NM+N is very different from .5. Thus
the probability computed using anthropic reasoning is very different from the
nonanthropic probability of .5. And it would clearly be very wrong for low
rank observers to claim that the true nonanthropic probability of Doom Soon
is NM+N . (And then be able to use anthropic reasoning to obtain a posterior
probability for Doom Soon of N
2
(M+N)2 ! )
3.1 The Doomsday Argument Conclusion
To vividly see what is problematic about the Doomsday Argument conclusion,
we might consider a Neanderthal of the year 40,000 B.C.E. with birth rank
40,000,00022 wondering about the future of intelligent life on earth. In one
possible world (Doom Soon), intelligent life will soon become extinct (so we
might set M equal to a number in the tens of millions) and in the other world
(Doom Later), intelligent life will continue for several more tens of thousands
of years at least (so we might set N equal to a number in the tens of billions).
So, a Neanderthal could use a Doomsday Argument to show that Doom Soon
is very likely23.
The point is not that the Neanderthal would be wrong. Had Doom Soon
been actual, the Neanderthal would have been right. The point is rather that
in both Doom Soon and Doom Later the observer of rank 40,000,000 would
estimate the probability of Doom Soon to be close to 1. Thus there is a .5
22For the Doomsday Argument conclusion to be derived, the Neanderthal does not have to
know her exact birth rank; it suffices to know her approximate rank and thus to know that
she is low rank.
23Of course, it would be unrealistic of the Neanderthal to only consider these two possibilities
but a more sophisticated scenario would still lead to a rather strong tendency to believe that
imminent doom is quite likely.
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prior probability that both the actual world is Doom Later and the observer
with rank 40,000,000 would estimate that Doom Soon is virtually certain. This
seems like an extreme failure of calibration.
This failure of calibration might lead to bad decision-making: Neanderthals
would think themselves justified to ignore the effects of their actions on the
welfare of any people who might be alive in the year 2011; in the almost certain
Doom Soon world, there is no intelligent life in the year 2011. Or we might
imagine a betting scenario. In both Doom Soon and Doom Later, the Nean-
derthal with rank 40,000,000 would be willing to make a bet that results in a
gain of 1,000 dollars (or Euros or rather units of utility because money had not
been invented yet) if Doom Soon is actual but that results in a loss of 100,000
in Doom Later. This does not appear to be a wise betting strategy.
3.2 The SIA
One way to avoid the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument is to not use a
prior probability of .5 for Doom Soon when calculating the posterior proba-
bility of Doom Soon. If we set Pz(Doom Soon) = MM+N , then the posterior
probability of Doom Soon will be .5. We might use the SIA (Self-Indication
Assumption)[Die92, Olu02] to justify the value of MM+N for the prior probabil-
ity. According to the SIA, we should other things being equal consider more
likely possible worlds in which there exist more observers or in which there exist
more observer-moments. We are assuming we have available to us some reason-
able way to count the number of observer-moments in a world w. We might
just add up the lifespans of all the observers in world w or we might have some
other simple and natural way of counting moments.
It is difficult to know how to interpret or justify the SIA. We start with a
totally nonanthropic prior and that prior has to be modified in order to take into
account the mere fact that we exist (this is one way the SIA has been explained)
but this modification is not taking into account any specific anthropic knowledge
we have about our identity or temporal location, not taking into account any
knowledge that we have and that other observer-moments do not have24
24Purely formally, we might use an indifference principle to justify a kind of SIA. A bare
(possible) worlds indifference principle would say that all possible worlds have equal prior
probability of being actual. This principle is rather implausible but if we really have very
little nonanthropic knowledge, we might use such an indifference principle. The centered
possible worlds version of the indifference principle would say that Pz should give equal prior
probability to all elements of W∗. The effect when applied to the Doomsday Argument
scenario is the same as using the SIA.
But the bare worlds indifference principle is implausible. We might instead use a prior
probability that depends on how simple the worlds are (i.e. the length of a description of
the worlds, the Kolmogorov complexity of the worlds)[Sol64]. But if we assume that Doom
Soon and Doom Later are equally complex worlds, then if N is much greater than M and
Doom Later is actual, it will take many more bits to describe who we are among the observer-
moments in Doom Later, then it would to describe who we are among the observer-moments
of Doom Soon if Doom Soon were actual and we needed only to identify which of M observer-
moments we are and thus we do not derive a prior that is equivalent to applying the SIA.
Instead the prior probabilities of Doom Soon and Doom Later will be roughly equal.
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Purely formally it is easy enough to precisify the SIA in the case where
there is a only a finite number of observers in each possible world and only
a finite number of worlds with observers. We distinguish between a preprior
Q that somehow does not take into account even the fact that we exist and a
prior P that is the result of modifying Q in accord with the SIA. (We are using
the notation P and Q rather than Pz and Qz because all observer-moments of
interest are using the same prior and preprior.) We can without loss of generality
assume that all possible worlds have at least one observer; it is simple enough
to conditionalize Q to take into account the fact that observers exist in the
actual world. This conditionalization will not affect the ratio of probabilities
of two possible worlds both of which have observers. Somehow the SIA needs
to modify that ratio in order to give more probability to worlds with more
observer-moments (or more observers).
We can use the formula P (v) = NvQ(v)∑
w∈W NwQ(w)
. Here for any w ∈ W , Nw
represents the number of observers (or observer-moments) in w. In the case
where Nw represents number of observer-moments, we assume that we have
available a reasonable measure or count of the number of observer-moments in
each world and that according to this count, the number of observers is finite
in each world.
But even if the SIA allows us to avoid the Doomsday Argument conclusion,
one might wonder if it is justified. One problem is how do we know that when
constructing Q, we did not already take sufficient account of the number of
observers and observer-moments in each possible world. Q was generated using
a procedure of some sort for distributing prior probability among the different
possible worlds and that procedure should take into account a complete descrip-
tion of each possible world and that description will include a specification of
the number of observers in each world.
However, there are fairly convincing wagering arguments in favor of the SIA.
If there are one million times as many observer-moments in Doom Later as in
Doom Soon, we might consider a wager f such that f(z) = 0 if z knows her
birth rank, f(z) = 10 if Doom Later is actual and z does not know her birth
rank and f(z) = −1000 if Doom Soon is actual and z is ignorant of her birth
rank25 . If every observer-moment believes the SIA, then the total amount of
money gained is 10N = 10, 000, 000M if Doom Later is actual, but a total of
only 1000M is lost if Doom Soon is actual. Since whether or not we believe the
SIA, we believe the prior probability of Doom Later is at least as great as that
of Doom Soon, it seems that observers should accept the wagering offer26. But
if all observers do not believe the SIA, they will all reject the offer.
This, however, is not quite an overwhelming argument for the SIA. In our
wagering scenario for everyone to accept the wager is not a Nash equilibrium
25[Bos07] describes a very similar wagering scenario(Beauty the High Roller) in order to
demonstrate that we if believe the SSSA and do not apply the SIA, we might run into problems.
His scenario is a variant of Sleeping Beauty and not Doomsday and he actually does not favor
the SIA but instead seems to favor the use of minimal reference classes (Rz = Kz).
26We are assuming that all observer-moments would prefer to maximize expected total
return.
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solution.
Assuming that all observers agree that everyone should try to the maximize
the total expected return of all the observers, we can easily agree that it is better
if everyone accepts rather than everyone rejecting, but a simple calculation
will show that it is even better if (in both possible worlds) everyone except
one observer-moment accepts rather than everyone accepting27. If every other
observer-moment except me has already made their decision whether or not to
accept and I am an observer-moment who does not know her birth rank, then
I can think, “with probability .5, I am in Doom Soon and by accepting, I will
decrease total return by 1000 dollars and with probability .5, I am in Doom
Later and by accepting will increase total return by 10 dollars. So regardless of
what the other observers do, I should reject”.28
Another problem with the SIA is that the same argument that an advocate
of the SIA could use against someone who applies the SSSA but not the SIA
could be used by someone who advocates a stonger version of the SIA such as
P (v) = N
2
vQ(v)∑
w∈W N
2
wQ(w)
against someone who advocate the usual version of the
SIA with P (v) = NvQ(v)∑
w∈W NwQ(w)
. Consider once again the wagering scenario
where observers do not know their birthrank. When computing the expected
total return, we used the preprior Q rather than the prior P . But if we really
believed the SIA, we should use P not Q29.
This time consider a wager that offers each observer-moment who does not
know her birth rank a gain of 10 dollars if Doom Later is actual but a loss of
100 million dollars if Doom Soon is actual. Observer-moments who do know
their birth-rank neither gain nor lose. If observers use the standard SIA to
compute their priors, then they will reject the wager. They will believe Doom
Later one million and not ten million times more likely than Doom Soon. If
they believe the strong SIA, they will accept the offer. But if they all accept
27Then the expected total return is .5(10N −10)− .5(1000M −1000) rather than .5(10N)−
.5(1000M).
28There is another wagering argument for the SIA that seems even stronger. We might
once again consider the Neanderthal with rank 40,000,000 who is betting on whether Doom
Soon or Doom Later is actual. This is a single observer here who does not know whether she
has rank 40,000,000 in Doom Soon or rank 40,000,000 in Doom Later. In either case, she can
either accept or reject the offer to wager. It seems like there is no question of several observers
having to coordinate their decisions, but actually there is a problem in the coordination of
actions between the observer with rank 40,000,000 in Doom Soon and the observer with rank
40,000,000 in Doom Later. We are modelling all observer-moments as being rational and
having a disposition to act rationally in response to decision problems. But if an observer-
moment who knew she had birth rank 40,000,000 did not know if the actual world world was
Doom Soon or Doom Later but knew that if the actual world were a different world than the
world it actually is, then the observer with rank 40,000,000 would act irrationally (Maybe the
irrationality in question is not true irrationality but only seem irrational according to a certain
controversial philosophical theory.), that would not make the observer with rank 40,000,000 in
the actual world want to act irrationally also. Each element z ∈W∗ makes her own decisions.
29It might be claimed that probabilities and betting odds should come apart[BL06] but
they should not come apart if we are rational. If we use the correct utility function U when
describing the consequences of accepting a bet, then we should use our probabilities in order
to determine betting odds. That is simply part of the meaning of utility and probability.
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and the actual world is Doom Later, the total gain is 10, 000, 000M but there
is a loss of 100, 000, 000M if Doom Later is actual. If we take seriously the SIA
prior according to which Doom Later is a million times more likely than Doom
Soon, it would appear better that everyone accept rather than everyone reject.
Of course, there is a similar argument that could be used by an advocate of
a superstrong SIA against the strong form of the SIA. Once again we see the
instability associated with the SIA.
3.2.1 The Presumptuous Philosopher
We might also doubt the SIA because of the unbelievably high probability esti-
mates for Doom Later. These probability estimates are so high that given the
fallibility of observation, it would seem that virtually no observational evidence
could lead us to believe that Doom Soon is highly probable. This is essentially
the Presumptuous Philosopher’s Scenario of Bostrom[BC03].
In the Presumptuous Philosopher’s Scenario, at a certain time in the fu-
ture there are only two viable candidates for the correct theory of fundamental
physics. According to one theory, the actual world is a Doom Soon world with
M observer moments and according to the other the actual world is a Doom
Later world with N observer moments. Based on nonanthropic considerations,
we should think both theories equally likely30 but if NM is huge enough (let us
say the ratio is 1050), then after we appy the SIA we see that the Doom Later
theory is almost certainly to be preferred. This would even be true if the nonan-
thropic preprior probability of Doom Later were extremely small (e.g. 10−20).
Thus Doom Later might not actually be a respectable scientific theory. It might
be a highly unlikely crank’s theory.
In any case we might try to collect additional observational evidence in order
to determine which theory is correct. It might even be true that there exists
observational evidence that if correctly observed and interpreted would allow us
to determine with certainty which theory is correct in the actual world. However,
there is always some probability that any given sequence of observations is
misinterpreted. The probability that we interpret a certain sequence of evidence
as evidence for Doom Soon when it is really evidence for Doom Later might
be small (e.g 10−30) but that small probability might not be small enough to
outweight the effect of the 1050 to 1 prior probability odds in favor of Doom
Later. And those prior odds might have been not 1050 but 1010
50
. In that case
experimental disconfirmation of Doom Later appears to be hopeless.
It seems, however, that there is a similar problem of lack of possibility of ex-
perimental disconfirmation even if we do not apply the SIA. Consider a variation
of the Doomsday Argument scenario where NM = 10
1010 . An observer-moment
30It is true that it is only certain observers who know that there are only two viable candi-
dates H1 and H2 for the correct theory of fundamental physics but it might still be the case
that all observers know that H1 and H2 have equal nonanthropic probability. In the actual
world because of cognitive limitations, there might actually be some observers who would
not agree that H1 and H2 should be given equal nonanthropic probability, but we make the
idealization that all observers are always perfectly ratioal.
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who knows she is low rank might want to estimate the probability the actual
world is Doom Soon. Her estimate will be so close to 1 that no amount of
experimental evidence could cause her to think Doom Later plausible.
But a problem of lack of testability can also arise in nonanthropic scenarios.
The reason for the lack of testability in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario
and in the scenario of the previous paragraph was the fact that one hypothesis
had a many times greater prior probability than another hypothesis and the
likelihood ratio was so great that no observational evidence could counteract the
initial bias in favor of the preferred hypothesis. The probabilities in question
were probabilities computed using the SIA or probabilities computed by revising
the nonanthropic probabilities by conditionalizing on the anthropic knowledge
we have available. But it does not matter how the probabilities were arrived at.
So consider the following nonanthropic scenario: There are two competing
hypotheses: A and B. We know exactly one of these hypotheses is true. Not
taking account of any anthropic information, we obtain a probability for A
that is 10100 times the probability for B. A and B do not disagree about the
number of observers or observer-moments in the actual world. For any number
N , they give the same answer to the question what is the probability that the
actual world has exactly N observers (or observer-moments). Although it seems
virtually certain that A is true, we can try to obtain additional observational
evidence to decide whether A or B is more likely. But given the possibility
of misinterpreting experimental evidence, it seems that no amount of evidence
could cause us to believe B more likely than A.
However, if we keep observing evidence that if treated as correctly interpreted
evidence would be evidence for the truth of B, we would not simply insist on
the truth of A. We might instead doubt our initial probability estimate that A
is 10100 times as likely as B. Or we might doubt our theory about the likelihood
of misinterpreting evidence. Even if B is some extremely implausible hypothesis
based on an unimaginative literal interpretation of some ancient sacred text, if
we keep observing evidence that appears to confirm B, we might be lead to
doubt the very low prior probability that we gave to B rather than continue to
doubt B.
In the case of the Presumptuous Philosopher, the untestability problem can
be avoided if instead of assuming the SIA, we assume that the probability that
the SIA is correct is .99999. This will bias us in favor of the hypothesis with more
observer-moments but the bias will not be so enormous as not to be overridable.
After all there are conflicting intuitions to deal with here. We do not have a
conclusive proof of the SIA and there are counterintuitive aspects to the SIA.
More on Untestability without the SIA And if we did not use the SIA
in order to analyze a Doomsday Argument scenario with NM very large such
as 1010
100
, we might be forced to resort to the same maneuver and say that
our assumptions such as our assumptions about the nonanthropic prior or our
assumptions about what the worlds Doom Soon and Doom Later are actually
like, could be incorrect and that our assumptions have a probability of at least
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.000001 of being incorrect. Consider the assumption that in both Doom Soon
and Doom Later there is exactly one observer who eventually comes to believe
she has rank 1 (and the similar assumption for any rank less than or equal
to M). There are so many observers in Doom Later and even if observers
usually are correct when they say they know their birth ranks, is it not possible
that 1 observer out of 1020 makes a mistake? And that some high rank Doom
Later observers mistakenly think they are rank 1 observers? Normally, we could
ignore this small probability of error but when we are dealing with huge NM , these
infrequent errors have to be taken into account.
If, in fact, no observer does make a mistake in either Doom Soon or Doom
Later, that is actually very strong evidence for Doom Soon since in Doom Later,
there are so many more opportuninities to make a mistake than in Doom Soon.
The prior probability of Doom Soon should be then even greater than .5 and
it will be even more impossible to use experimental data to refute Doom Soon.
But that is to be expected with fantastic assumptions. However, for the actual
Doomsday Argument scenario, as we have specified it, there really is a bad
problem that we cannot disconfirm the hypothesis that Doom Soon is actual.
If we want to avoid the untestability problem, perhaps we should try another
approach such as the minimal reference class approach.
3.3 Using Minimal Reference Classes
In the Doomsday Argument scenario the objective nonanthropic probability
of Doom Soon is .5. If we use the SIA, then the probability estimates for
Doom Soon used by observer-moments of the form (o, 0) will differ from the
nonanthropic probability. If we apply the SSSA and use the maximal reference
class W∗, then the probability estimates of observer-moments of the form (o, 1)
will differ from the nonanthropic probability. One way to avoid both problems is
to use minimal reference classes and not use the SIA. So we might use Rz = Kz
for all z ∈W∗.
If z is an observer-moment ignorant of her birth rank, then z knows nothing
beyond the fact that she belongs to the reference class Rz and thus there is
no relevant anthropic information that can be used to revise the nonanthropic
prior probability estimate of .5 for Doom Soon. If z knows her birth rank, then
again there is no additional information that can be used to modify the initial
estimate. So if we use minimal reference classes, we are double-halfers. Many
researcher favor the double-halfer position in this and similar scearios[Mea08a,
Bos07, Coz07, Pusar]
But it would seem that as double-halfers we are not taking advantage of
information that we actually do have. We start out not knowing our birth rank
and estimate the likelihood of Doom Soon as .5. If later we learn that we are
high rank, we are forced to conclude that Doom Later is actual. So learning
that we are high rank is evidence against Doom Soon. But then learning that
we are not high rank should count as evidence in favor of Doom Soon and should
raise our probability estimate for Doom Soon above .5.
There is also a Dutch Book argument against being a double-halfer. If an
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observer-moment totally ignorant of birth rank will believe the probability of
Doom Soon to be .5, then she will believe the probability that she is low rank
and Doom Soon is actual to be .5 and the probability that she is low rank and
Doom Later is actual to be .5(MN ) because Doom Later has probability .5 and
a fraction MN of the observer-moments in Doom Later who do not know their
birth rank are low rank. So an observer-moment who does not know her birth
rank would believe that the conditional probability of Doom Soon being actual
given that she is low rank is equal to .5
.5+ M2N
and that is not the same as the
probability estimate of .5 that she would use for Doom Soon if she in fact does
learn that it is low rank. This discrepency seems problematic and will allow us
to create a Dutch Book.
It is easy enough to create a Dutch Book here. Define a wager f such that
f(z) = 0 if z is an observer-moment that is part of a high rank observer, f(z) = 1
if z is low rank and does not know her birth rank and z lives in Doom Soon,
f(z) = −N+M2M if z is low rank and does not know her birth rank and z lives
in Doom Later, f(z) = N+2M3M if z knows she is low rank and z is part of the
Doom Later world, and f(z) = −N+3M4M if z knows she is low rank z is part of
the Doom Soon world.
Clearly all these offers to wager will be accepted if all observer-moments use
minimal reference classes. An observer-moment who is ignorant of birth rank
will compute her expected return as .5− .5(N+M2M )(MN ) > .5− .5(N+N2M (MN )) = 0.
A observer-moment who is aware of being low rank will compute an expected
value of .5(N+2M3M − N+3M4M ) and N+2M3M =
N+N3 +
8M
3
4M >
N+M3 +
8M
3
4M =
N+3M
4M . But
assuming all these offers to wager are accepted, we can see that if the actual
world is Doom Later, high rank observers neither lose nor gain while low rank
observers will experience a total return of N+2M3M − N+M2M < 0. If the actual
world is Doom Soon, then each observer suffers a loss of N+3M4M − 1 dollars31.
If we are double-halfers, we are vulnerible to Dutch Books. If we use minimal
reference classes, we can easily be Dutch-Booked.
31This Dutch Book Argument is really a collective Dutch Book argument because it adds
up the returns of different observer-moments. Double-halfers maintain that the same observer
before and after learning its birth-rank is a different observer-moment and there is no reason
that there need be a simple relationship between the probability distributions used by distinct
observer-moments. Moreover it might not be justified to add up the utilities of different
observer-moments especially when they are not even in the same knowledge state; the same
observer before and after learning her birth rank know different things and make independent
decisions. But if we are not to be too free to be ad hoc, we need to be guided by some
priniciple that says something about how the posterior probability distributions of different
observer-moments, even different observer-moments in different knowledge states, should be
related to each other. We need a constraint and Dutch Book arguments will provided a natural
constraint. They have an advantage over other arguments that involve averaging or adding up
the returns of different observer-moments in that we do not need to know anything or assume
anything about the nonanthropic prior P .
20
3.3.1 Purely Hypothetical Priors
But if there were no time-period during which observers did not know their birth
ranks, then we could not actually set up a Dutch Book. We might model each
observer as consisting of exactly one observer-moment who knows her rank. But
even if there is no actual Dutch Book, there is a hypothetical Dutch Book. The
version of the Doomsday Argument scenario in which observer-moments always
know their birth ranks and the version in which they have a stage in which
they are totally ignorant of birth rank are very similar versions and should have
similar analyses. It should not really matter that much whether there actually
was a stage when observer-moments did not know their birth ranks.
In any case, in the one moment per observer version, there is still a problem
low rank observer have of justifying a probability estimate of .5 for Doom Soon.
All observers know the totally nonanthropic probability estimate for Doom Soon
is .5. But this estimate is supposed to not take into account any anthropic in-
formation including the information about birth rank that all observers actually
have. That estimate needs to be revised to take into account knowledge of birth
rank. Evidence that one is low rank is evidence in favor of Doom Soon and thus
the probability estimate of .5 needs to be increased.
To sum up, in the Doomsday Argument and similar scenarios we have a
trilemma. We can accept the validity of the Doomsday Argument, we can
accept the SIA, or we can accept being vulnerible to Dutch Books.
4 Sleeping Beauty
In the Doomsday Argument scenario, observers use information about their
identity in order to estimate probabilities for (bare) worlds. But observers (ac-
tually observer-moments) might also use information about temporal location
to help them figure out which world is most likely to be actual. Consider the
Sleeping Beauty scenario[Elg00].
Sleeping Beauty is the subject of an experiment. On Sunday a fair coin is
tossed. If the coin lands heads, Beauty will be given an amnesia-inducing drug
only on Sunday night. If the coin lands tails, the drug will be taken on both
Sunday and Monday night. Regardless of how the coin lands, the drug will
not be given at any time other than one particular Sunday and one particular
Monday night.
When the drug is adminstered to Beauty at night, the effect is to give her
amnesia the next day. It has no effect on her rationality. Even the amnesia
is only partial. She does not forget the protocol of the experiment. But the
amnesia is such that she cannot tell the difference between different days during
which she is under the influence of the drug. She is in the same subjective
psychological state on all days when she wakes up under the influence of the
drug32.
32This scenario can be varied so that instead of always being the same exact state when she
wakes up under the influence of the drug, she might be in a randomly selected member of a
21
On each day when she is under the influence of the drug as soon as she wakes
up, she is asked to estimate a probability that the coin landed heads.
We might analyze the Sleeping Beauty scenario by treating each day of an
observer’s life as a separate observer-moment and we shall assume that for any
observer-moment z and any two observer-moments y1 and y2 that last a sin-
gle day and live in the same possible world, Pz(y1) = Pz(y2). Then if z is
an observer-moment corresponding to a day of Beauty’s life while under the
influence of the drug and we use Rz = Kz (use the minimal reference class)
and do not make the self-indication assumption, it is simple enough to see
that Pz(heads|Kz) = .5. There is a nonanthropic probability of .5 for heads
and Beauty has no anthropic information that can be used to modify this
probability[Lew01]. If Beauty employed the SIA, then Q(heads) = .5 but af-
ter modification to give twice the probability to tails because the tails world
has twice as many observer-moments in the relevant reference class, we get
P (heads) = 13 and since there is no anthropic information to condition on, we
have Pz(heads|Kz) = 13 .
If instead of using the minimal, we use the maximal reference class, and do
not make the SIA, then we also have Pz(heads|Kz) = 13 . If the reference class is
all observer-moments, then the fact that Beauty knows she belongs to the class
of moments under the influence of the drug is relevant information. Assuming
that the total number of observer-days is not affected by whether the coin lands
heads or tails and that all that the coin affects is whether a particular observer
has amnesia on a certain Tuesday and also assuming that there is no other
observer-moment that is in the same subjective psychological state as is Beauty
on the days she is suffering from amnesia, then it is twice as likely in the tails
world as in the head world that a random observer-day will be a day in the life
of Beauty when she is suffering from amnesia. So it is reasonable to use the 13
estimate for heads.
5 Cosmology’s Link with Observation
If certain recent speculation is to be trusted, the universe is huge, so huge that
anything that it is physically possible to observe will (with probability one) be
observed[Bos02b]. For any set E of possible experimental evidence, there will
be some observer in the universe who will observe E and that observer will
actually observe E rather than just mistakenly interpret data to mean that E
has been observed. That means that if w and v are any two physically possible
(bare) possible worlds, then for any observer-moment o living in world w, there
exists an observer-moment o′ living in world v who is in the same subjective
psychological state as o33 . Thus the mere fact that E has been observed by
someone cannot be taken as evidence for w being actual.
certain set S of state but knowing which member of S is her current state will not give her any
information about whether the coin landed heads or tails or about whether the current day is
Monday or Tuesday. A further discussion of irrelevant information is contained in section 12.
33Actually this is a little imprecise. It would be more correct to say that if we pick any set E
of observ ational evidence and any possible world w in which there exists an observer-moment
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What can be taken as evidence for w being actual is that we observe E. In
v it is only freak observer-moments that observe E. In w, E is observed by
observer-moments who are not freaks. In v if a random observer-moment per-
forms the appropriate experiments and follows the appropriate observartional
protocols, the observer-moment might observe E but is much more likely to
observe something else; in w, a random observer-moment performing the appro-
priate experiments and following the appropriate observational protocols would
be very likely to observe E.
It seems that in order to determine if v or w is most likely to be actual, we
need to apply anthropic reasoning. For example we might apply the SSSA.
But if we allow anthropic reasoning in the Cosmology’s Link with Obser-
vation scenario, it is difficult to see how we might justify avoiding anthropic
reasoning and the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument in the Doomsday Ar-
gument scenario. If we modify the Doomsday Argument scenario so that instead
of observers learning their rank, they only learn whether their rank is less than
or equal to .9999M or not, we see that if NM is very large, then there is a very
strong structural similarity between this scenario and the cosmology’s link with
observation scenario.
Let E be making the observation that one’s rank is less than or equal to
.9999M. In Doom Soon, all but a few freak observers make this observation.
In Doom Later, only a few freak observers make this observation. Then we
are essentially in the cosmology’s link with observation scenario and would be
applying Doomsday Argument reasoning to reach conclusions about cosmology.
6 Duplicating Al
Elga[Elg04] discusses an interesting scenario in which an observer might know
which world is actual and has to determine his identity within that actual world.
Elga wants to justify a certain limited indifference principle. If o1 and o2 are two
observers34 in the same possible world and o1 and o2 are in identical subjective
psychological states and we know we are either o1 or o2, should we say that we
are as likely to be o1 as o2? The answer yes to this question has intuitive appeal
(if we are not going to say yes, then on what basis are we going to estimate
relative likelihood?) based on evidential symmetry[Whi10], but perhaps there
are other arguments for Pz(x) = Pz(y) when x and y inhabit the same possible
world and especially when Ky = Kx = Kz.
So we might consider a scenario in which there is only one possible world w
and in w someone has created a duplicate of a certain person Al. There might
have been earlier periods of his life, when Al had no duplicate but now and
indeed at any time of his life after a certain time t, Al has a duplicate (Aldup).
At any time when both Al and Aldup exist, they are in the same subjective
who has observed E, then if we pick a world v at random, the probability is 1 that there exists
at least one observer-moment in v who will also observe E. But the imprecise version is good
enough for our purposes.
34Elga talks about observers and not observer-moments.
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psychological state. For example, right now, they are in the same state. Al
(and also Aldup) wants to knows the probability that he is Al. The intuitive
answer is .5.
We might try to justify this answer by comparison with some other scenarios.
What if there are actually two worlds, H and T, and in both worlds a duplicate
of Al is created. Whether the actual world is H (probability .1) or T (probability
.9) is determined by the toss of an unfair coin. Neither Al nor Aldup knows
whether they are in H or T. The coin tossing is entirely independent of the
duplication and thus should not affect Al’s (and Aldup’s) estimate of how likely
he is to be Al. But it is not clear what that probability should be so consider
another scenario.
This scenario is just like the previous scenario except that in H, AlDup is
killed, and in T, Al is killed. We might analyze H as containing three (relevant)
observer-moments: HAL1, HAL2, HALDUP1. HAL1 and HALDUP1 are in
identical subjective psychological states. HAL2 is in a different state than HAL1.
T contains three (relevant) observer-moments: TAL1, TALDUP1, TALDUP2.
TAL1 and TALDUP1 are in identical subjective psychological states. TALDUP2
is in a different state. Since none of the observer-moments knows which world is
actual, we require that HAL1 and TAL1 (First Stage of Al in H and T worlds)
are in the same subjective psychological state. We also require that HAL2
(Second Stage of Al in H world) and TALDUP2 (Second Stage of AlDup in T
world) be in the same state.
HAL2 (and thus TALDUP2) need to estimate the probability that he is
HAL. We might agree with Elga that the nonanthropic prior probability of H is
.1, but both HAL2 and TALDUP2 have anthropic knowledge that might affect
their estimate for the probability of being Al. They both know they are in same
knowledge state as HAL2. If the reference class we are using consists of all six
observer-moments, then we might say this anthropic knowledge is not helpful.
In both H and T, one third of the observer-moments are in the same knowledge
state as HAL2. Yes, but who said that PHAL2 gives equal prior probability to
all three observer-moments in H (and also gives equal prior probability to all
three observer-moments in T)? Is not that too similar to what we are trying to
prove?
If they both use a minimal reference class, then both HAL2 and TALDUP2
will think that the probability he is HAL2 is .1. But that does not mean that
in the scenario where Al and AlDup are not killed (so we also have TAL2 and
HALDUP2 among our observer moments) that necessarily that HAL2 (and
TALDUP2) should believe he is nine times as likely to be TALDUP2 as to be
HAL2. Assume everyone uses minimal reference classes. That still does not
tell us how the .1 total probability for H is split by PHAL2 between HAL2 and
HALDUP2. We cannot assume equal division. That would be too similar to
what we are trying to prove. Maybe HAL2 should think he is twice as likely to
be HAL2 as to be HALDUP2 and twice as likely to be TAL2 as to be TALDUP2
( and then HAL2 would think he is only 4.5 times as likely to be TALDUP2
as HAL2). Since the coin flip is really irrelevant, in our first scenario where we
knew which world was actual and only needed to estimate a probability that we
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are AL rather than ALdup, we might well give the answer 23 . We do not have
an indifference principle.
We might try another approach to establishing our limited indifference prin-
ciple. Let us go back to the original scenario with no coin toss. Al and AlDup
at any given time when they are both alive are in the same subjective psycho-
logical state. It would seem that both Al and AlDup would have to give the
same answer to the question of what is the probability that he is Al, but would
it be rational for both of them to think that probability is .75? There appears
to be a simple argument for a negative answer35.
Let f be a wager with f(Al) = 136 and f(Aldup) = −2 and f(z) = 0 for
any z other than Al or ALDup. If both Al and AlDup think they are three
times as likely to be Al as AlDup, they would both accept the wager because
3(1) − 1(2) > 0. But then if they both accept the wager, the total return is
1 − 2 = −1. Assuming both Al and AlDup agree that a greater total return is
better than a smaller total return, it seems unfortunate that they would both
accept the wager.
Al could reason as follows: I do not know if I am Al or AlDup. If the other
guy (Al if I am AlDup and AlDup if I am Al) did not accept the offer and I also
do not accept, the total return is zero. If instead I accept then since I am 3 times
as likely to be Al as AlDup, the expected total return is .75(1)− .25(2) > 0. If
the other guy accepted and I do not accept, then the other guy is 3 times as
likely to be AlDup as AL so the expected return is .25(1)− .75(2) = −1.25 but
if I accept the total return is 1− 2 = −1 > −1.25. So no matter what the other
guy does, I should accept. Of course, it is unfortunate that the other guy could
go through the same reasoning, but I am more likely to be Al.
In other words, the wagering argument is not totally convincing. But if both
the solution where Al (and AlDup) think they are three times as likely to be Al
as Aldup and the one where they think the two alternatives are equally likely
are possible solutions to the game of choosing a probability of being Al, we
might prefer the equiprobability solution since it leads to greater total return.
7 Who or What is an Observer
Our posterior probability estimate for Doom Soon in the Doomsday Argument
sceario depends on who or what is considered to be an observer37 What is
an observer is context dependent. For our purposes a context is a set W∗ of
centered worlds of the form (w, c) where c is something that exist in (bare)
35See the analysis by [Bos02a] of the dungeon gedanken wherein the world is a dungeon
with ninety blue cells and ten red cells and there is an observer in each cell who cannot see
the color of her cell but needs to guess the probability that her cell is blue. The intuitive
answer is .9.
36Assume that it is safe to use the SSA instead of SSSA or that we are only consider one
moment of Al and one moment of AlDup.
37Of course, if z wants to estimate the probability of Doom Soon, she could use a Wz∗ that
contains non-observers provided the nonobservers are never allowed to be part of Rz . But it
is simpler just not to allow non-observers into Rz in the first place.
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possible world w. An observer z (or rather an observer-moment z because an
observer might have different beliefs and different abilities at different times)
with respect to context W∗ is an element of W∗ that is capable of reasoning
probabilistically about which element of W∗ she is.
The observer-moment z knows that she belongs to Kz, but she must be
capable of hypothetical reasoning about her location in W∗. She must be able
to reason about what she would believe and how she would make decisions if she
did not take into account some of the knowledge she actually does have about her
location in W∗. She must be able to reason about what her probabilistic beliefs
should be if, for example, for all she knew she could be any observer-moment in
some set A ⊆W∗ with A 6= Kz38.
Observer-moments with respect to W∗ are not required to actually have
precise (hypothetical) probabilistic beliefs or to have coherent beliefs about who
they are among the members of the set W∗. But it has to be the case that if they
were faced with a wager about who they are among the elements of W∗, they
would be able to act as if they were formulating sufficiently precise, sufficiently
coherent probabilistic beliefs and be able to maximize their expected utility
based on these beliefs when deciding whether to accept or reject the wager. It
might be the case that in any possible world that an observer-moment thinks
has any chance of being actual and in any possible world that might have any
chance of being actual if it were the case that she had less anthropic knowledge
than she actually does have, she will not be faced with a decision problem that
will require her to think rationally about who she is among the elements of
W∗, but she might still have the capacity for such rationality and thus might
be considered an observer-moment with respect to W∗. We need to require
rationality of observers in order for our wagering arguments to make sense.
It might not be enough to assume rationality of all observer-moments in
W∗. Our wagering arguments presuppose all the observer-moments using the
same nonanthropic prior P . In the actual world, even expert observer-moments
might disagree about what is the correct nonanthropic prior P . But they still
might be able to use and understand the motivation for the correct prior P .
We assume that all observer-moments, even if they do not know the correct
theory of nonanthropic reasoning, could learn that P is a reasonable prior even
if not necessarily the optimal prior. Thus it might make sense to imagine all
observer-moments as using P .
But we would like to say that most adult humans are observers. Yet hu-
mans have limited ability to reason coherently and exactly about probabilistic
knowledge and perhaps limited ability to understand how to calculate the cor-
rect nonanthropic prior. A certain amount of idealization is inevitable. But our
theory of anthropic reasoning is a normative theory, not a descriptive theory.
It might be still be useful to model humans as if they had the capacity to be
perfectly rational in a certain context.
Taking into account the fact that humans can use aids such as computers or
38Of course, any y 6∈ Kz knows that she is not z and thus it might seem that is impossible
to reason as if one might be y and one might be z, but one can reason as if one did not know
anything other than Kz = A and as if no element y ∈ A knew anything other than Ky = A.
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experts to help them make probabilistic computations and that humans might
become more rational then they normally are when the stakes are sufficiently
high, it might not be too much of an idealization to model a human as if she
were an observer. Moreover, we are only requiring observerhood with respect to
a limited context. In any case we might say that much of the human failure of
rationality is a failure of performance and not competence. There might be a set
S of probabalistic statements about W∗ such that some human understands S
and can solve simple problems that require the use of S as premises bur cannot
solve problem that would require the application of long chains of mathematical
and logical reasoning using the premises S but if the human had the capacity for
handling computational complexity, then she would be able to reason coherently
about which of the elements of W∗ she is likely to be.
7.1 But which context W∗ should be used?
An observer-moment might be an observer-moment with respect to several dif-
ferent contexts (i.e sets of centered worlds). So the issue arises when estimating
posterior probabilities which context should an observer-moment use. The an-
swer in general is use the largest possible context. A low rank observer-moment
in the Doomsday Argument scenario might be able to use the anthropic infor-
mation that she is low rank rather than high rank together with her knowledge
that low rank observers are atypical in Doom Later to derive the conclusion
that the actual world is rather unlikely to be Doom Later. But this requires
that she use a context W∗ that includes high rank observer-moments although
she knows she is not high rank.
So, if z is an observer-moment with respect to contexts A and B with A ⊂ B
and different posterior probability estimates would be obtained using B rather
than A, it is preferable to use the larger context, B.
8 Putting A Measure on Observer-Moments in
the Same Possible World
We need to return to the question of choosing an anthropic prior Pz given a
nonathropic prior P . We have already seen (in section 6) why we might prefer
that if x, y ∈ Kz and x∗ = y∗, then Pz(x) = Pz(y). But that is surely not the
only reasonable choice. Maybe, we should let Pz(x) depend on the length of the
minimum length description of x (and not just on the subjective psychological
state of x). But the case where x, y ∈ Kz is not the only case where we need to
compare Pz(y) and Pz(x).
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8.1 What if x and y are in the same possible world but
not in the same knowledge state?
We might like to generalize the equiprobability assumption to the case where
x 6∈ Ky but x and y are in the same possible world39. But it does not seem
correct to necessarily give equal prior probability to x and y if x exists for a
longer time than y or x is capable of representing more information than y.
We shall eventually generalize the equiprobability assumption in a way that
takes into account the amount of information that can be represented. But first
we shall discuss a crude approximation that involves the concept of atomic or
indecomposable atomic-moments. As crude as the concept is, in practice people
often do model observers as consisting of a succession of time-slices such that no
significant belief change can take place during a time-slice but radical changes
can take place in the transition from one time-slice to the next. So the concept
of indecomposability is worth investigating.
If an observer-moment is indecomposable, it cannot be meaningfully ex-
pressed as a union of smaller observer-moments (i.e. observer-moments with
shorter durations). If an observer-moment o exists during the time-interval t1
and also during the time interval t2 and believes different thing during t1 than
during t2, then the observer-moment is definitely not atomic. There might be
no great difference between what is believed during t1 and what is believed at
t2, but if there is any disagreement even if only about what time it is, then we
cannot say that o has definite beliefs or a definite knowledge state and thus o
is not atomic. If o is capable of reasoning about whether the current time is
part of the time interval t1 or part of the time interval t2 or neither and has
different beliefs about that issue during t1 than t2, than o is not atomic and o
does not have a definite knowledge state. Our analyses up to this point assumed
that observer-moments had definite knowledge states. That is one reason that
atomic observer-moments are interesting.
Even if in fact o believed exactly the same things (including beliefs about
what time it is) during t1 and t2, o might still not be atomic. Maybe the only
reason that the same things were believed during t1 as during t2 is that o was
exposed to the same evidence during the two time-intervals but if she had been
exposed to different evidence (and she could have been exposed to different
evidence) she would have had different beliefs. In that case, o is not atomic.
Perhaps she does have a definite knowledge state, but she might not have had
a definite knowledge state. What matters is capability. It might be true that in
any world that o believes has any chance of being actual, o will not be exposed
to different evidence during t1 and t2, but it still might be true that if she were
exposed to different evidence, she could have different beliefs during t1 and t2.
Of course, she could have different beliefs if her neurophysiology and psycholog-
ical capabilities were different then they actually are, but I am concerned with
what she could believe given her actual physical and psychological capabilities.
If she is actually capable of believing different things at different subintervals
39And we also require that x, y both belong to the relevant reference class Rz for some
z ∈W∗.
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of the time-interval during which she exists, then o is not atomic and she is
decomposable. If she is not capable, then she is atomic.
It is actually rather an extreme idealization to view an observer i as a suc-
cession of atomic observer-moments such that if i1 and i2 are atomic observer-
moments belonging to i with i2 occurring immediately after i1, then no belief
change is possible at all during the time interval when i1 exists or during the
time interval when i2 exists but abrupt change is possible at the transition from
i1 to i2. But it is a convenient crude approximation that can later be refined.
In fact, we need to refine our criterion for atomicity. If an observer-moment
o exists during the time intervals t1 and t2, what matter is not whether o can
believe different things during t1 as during t2 but whether her beliefs at t2 could
be independent of her beliefs at t1 if she were exposed to (and she could be
exposed) to very different evidence. If it were inevitable that what she believed
at t2 is totally predictable given what she believed at t1 (and independent of any
additional evidence she had at t2, then regardless of how different her beliefs
might be at t2 from what they were at t1, we could not really decompose o into
o at t1 plus o at t240. We do not have independence. We have total dependence.
It would be wrong to think of the observer-submoment at t1 and the observer-
submoment at t2 as truly different if the belief during t2 are fixed given the
beliefs during t1.
We might also have partial dependence. In practice, o during t2 maybe
should believe something very similar to what was believed at t1 because, for
example, t2 occurs right after t1 and it takes time for the state of the world
to change very much, but if the world did change very much and there were
evidence of such change and yet o during t2 is in part constrained from form-
ing her beliefs solely based on the evidence available to her (including any
communication (i.e. memory) she might have received from the o during t1
observer-submoment) and forced to believe certain things solely because they
were believed by o during t1 or if it is impossible for o during t2 to observe very
different evidence than the evidence observed by o during t1, then we might say
that we have partial dependence and not independence.
In practice, we will always have some dependence. The further apart in time
the two time-intervals, t1 and t2 are, the less dependence we expect. But there
will be some dependence.
We shall, however, start with an idealized model each observer consists of
a finite set of totally independent observer-moments. Each observer-moment
then can say of any y ∈ W∗, “yes, for all I know, I might be y” or “no, I know
I am not y”. Thus all observer-moments are representing the same amount of
information. They all represent |W ∗| bits of information where |W ∗| represents
the number of observer-moments in W∗. Furthermore there is no redundancy
between what one observer-moment is capable of representing and what another
observer-moment is representing.
40Of course, instead of the observer-moment at t2 being dependent on the observer-moment
at t1, we could have dependence in the reverse direction or in both directions and this is true
regardless of whether t1 occurred before or occurred after t2
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To say that there is no redundancy is to say that for any V ⊂ W∗ and
any z ∈ W∗, it could be the case that z is exposed to evidence that insures
that Kz = V and this is true regardless of what is believed or what evidence
is available to any other observer-moment. But we need to be careful about
the “could be the case”. It most likely will not be the case in any world that
has nonzero probability according to P . But z is physically and psychologically
capable of obtaining evidence that would lead her to have the knowledge state V
regardless of what the other observer-moments believed, or knew and regardless
of the evidence they were exposed to.
In this idealized model of independent atomic-moments, it is appealing to
say that Pz(x) = Pz(y) if x∗ = y∗ even if Kx 6= Ky. After all, even if x and y are
not in the same knowledge state, they could have been. And if they were, they
would have the same prior probability. Symmetry considerations should tempt
one to think that Pz(x) should not depend on exactly what x does believe, but
on what it could believe. It is difficult to see how we could justify a particular
rule for making Pz(x) depend on Kx.
But if we do assume that Pz(x) = Pz(y) if x∗ = y∗, then for any A ⊂ x∗,
Pz(A) is proportional to the total amount of information that can be represented
by the observer-moments in A. It is tempting to generalize this information-
theoretic criterion to the case whereW∗ is not just a set of independent observer-
moments. So even if independence and atomicity assumptions are false of W∗,
we would say that if x∗ = y∗, z ∈ W∗, A,B ⊆ x∗ then Pz(A)Pz(B) is equal to the
ratio of the total amount of information that can be represented by the observer-
moments in A to the total amount of information that can be represented by the
observer-moments in B. By total amount of information that can be represented
by A or B, we mean the number of bits needed to represent the knowledge states
of all the observer-moments in A or all the observer-moments in B.
This information-theoretic criterion is useful, but in most of the rest of this
paper, we idealize and assume that either W∗ is a finite set of independent
atomic moments or that, in any case, we can reason as if W∗ consisted of a finite
number of independent atomic moments and that means that for any z ∈ W∗,
any w ∈W , any A ⊆ w∗, Pz(A|w∗) = |A||w∗| . Here | | means cardinality of. Thus
the prior probability of A given w∗ is equal to the number of observer-moments
in A divided by the total number of observer-moments in world w.
Now that we have a simple way of splitting the prior probability of a world
among the observer-moments that belong to that world and the relevant refer-
ence class, we need to discuss how to choose that reference class.
9 Choosing A Reference Class
The posterior probability estimates Pz(A|Kz) depend on the reference classes
Rz. We knows that Kz ⊆ Rz. If y ∈ Kz, then z does not know that she is not y.
So Pz(y|Kz) must be meaningful and thus y ∈ Rz. But if we choose Rz = Kz,
we will have trouble linking cosmology with observation (see section 5). In this
section we discuss how to choose a reference class under the assumption that
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all the finitely many observer-moments in W∗ are independent and that for any
world w, if x, y ∈ w and z ∈W∗, then Pz(x) = Pz(y). Under these assumptions
we can provide both collective Dutch Book and relative frequency arguments in
favor of using the maximal reference class Rz = W∗. If we can prove that we
would obtain the same posterior probability estimate Pz(A) if we used a smaller
reference class, then we might use a smaller reference class, but, in principle,
we should use maximal reference classes.
9.1 A Collective Dutch Book Argument
Our collective Dutch book arguments involve showing that under certain as-
sumptions if observer-moments use non-maximal reference classes, then a col-
lective Dutch Book can be constructed. That means there exists a wager f that
could be accepted by all observer-moments41 such that if observer-moments use
non-maximal reference classes when calculating their posterior probabilities and
observer-moments make decisions in a such a way as to optimize their expected
utility, then in no possible world w is the sum
∑
z∈w∗ f(z) positive and in some
worlds, it is negative. But that means that regardless of which nonathropic
prior P we use, if we were to pick an observer-moment y at random by first
using P to pick a world w at random and then giving each z ∈ w∗ an equal
chance of being selected, the expected value of f(y) would be negative.
We can generalize the Dutch Book we constructed when discussing the Dou-
ble Halfer analysis of the Doomsday Argument (and Sleeping Beauty) scenarios.
Assume that there exists at least two different possible worlds v and w and four
different observer-moments v1, v2 ∈ v∗ and w1, w2 ∈ w∗ with Kv1 = Kw1 and
Kv2 = Kw2 6= Kw1 . Thus all we are really assuming is that there are two differ-
ent observer-moments in different knowledge states who do not know whether
the actual world is v or w. If observer-moments living in the same possible world
have the same prior probability and if all four observer-moments use maximal
reference classes and c2 is defined so that Pw2(w2|Kw2) = c2Pw2(v2|Kw2) and c1
is defined so that Pw1(w1|Kv1) = c1Pw1(v1|Kv1), we should have c2 = c1 Thus
if w1 thinks she is c1 times more likely to be w1 than v1, the observer-moment
w2 will also think that she is c2 = c1 times more likely to be w2 than v2. If
c1 > c2, then a Dutch Book can be constructed.
Without loss of generality, we might assume that c1 > 1. Then choose two
numbers a > 1 and b > 1 such that c1 > b > a > c2. Let f be a wager such that
f(w1) = 1, f(v1) = −b, f(w2) = −1 − , f(v2) = a(1 + ) and for every other
observer-moment z, f(z) = 0. All observer-moments would be willing to accept
this wager. The observer-moments v1 and w1 think it c1 times as likely that
they win 1 as that they lose b < c1. The observer-moments v2 and w2 think it
c2 times as likely that they lose 1 +  as that they win a(1 + ) but a > c2.
We do have a Dutch Book. In world w, the total return is −, which is
negative if  > 0. In world v, the total return is −b+ a(1 + ), which is negative
41I write “could be accepted” because for many observer-moments z, f(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Kz
and it does not matter whether such obsever-moments accept or reject. So we really require
that all observer-moments believe that accepting is at least as good as rejecting
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if a(1 + ) < b and it is certainly possible to choose a positive  that makes this
true.
If maximal reference classes are used, we will certainly have c2 = c1. But
if w1 uses a nonmaximal reference class R, let R1w be the number of observer-
moments in w that are in R and R1v be the number of observer-moments in v
that are in R. Then given the fact that all observer-moments in the reference
class that lives in the same possible world has the same prior probability, we have
that c1 =
P (w)R1v
P (v)R1w
where P represents the nonanthropic prior. With obvious
notation we also have c2 =
P (w)R2v
P (v)R2w
. There is no reason then that c1 and c2
need be equal.
Our Dutch Book result can be generalized to the case where we have worlds
w1, w2 . . . , wn and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists observer-moments ai, bi ∈ wi such
that for all 1 ≤ i < n, ai and bi+1 are in the same knowledge state and also an
and b1 are in the same knowledge state, but each ai is in a different knowledge
state.42
9.2 A Relative Frequency Argument for Maximal Refer-
ence Classes
Our other argument for the use of maximal reference classes is a relative fre-
quency argument. We shall just illustrate how the relative frequency argument
would work when applied to the Doomsday Argument scenario. So assume that
instead of just having a Doom Soon and a Doom Later world, we have many
different dimensions in which possible worlds can vary. Thus a world w will be
characterized by a binary digit number a of length n. Let ai represent the ith
digit of a. If ai = 0, we say the world is Doom Soon in dimension i. If ai = 1,
it is Doom Later in dimension i. If v and w are two different n-digit numbers,
then the actual world is as likely to be characterized by v as by w. So the prior
probability of any particular world is 2−n.
Observers are characterized by a multidimensional rank. Their multidimen-
sional rank is an n digit binary number. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if a world w is Doom
Soon in dimension i, then all observers have rank 0 (low rank) in dimension i,
42Let ci =
Pai (ai)
Pai (bi+1)
if 1 ≤ i < n and cn = Pan (an)Pan (b1) . Then if we use maximal reference
classes we should have
∏
ci = 1. If not all observer-moments ai use maximal reference classes,
we might not have
∏
ci = 1. If not, a collective Dutch Book can be constructed.
Without loss of generality assume that
∏
ci > 1. Let 0 < r < 1 be a number that we
will want to be just slightly less than one. We define a wager f so that f(z) = 0 except for
observer-moments of the form ai or bi. If 1 ≤ i < n, we will have f(ai) = r2i−2
∏i−1
1
cj while
f(bi+1) = −r2i−1
∏i
1
cj . f(an) = r
2n−2 and f(b1) = −r2n−1
∏n
1
ci. Then an observer-
moment who thinks she is ci times more likely to be ai than bi+1 will accept the wager as will
an observer-moment who thinks she is cn times more likely to be an than b1. So everyone
accepts the offer. But in world wi with 2 ≤ i ≤ n, the amount gained by ai is r times the
amount lost by bi and thus the sum of the returns is negative. In world w1, the sum of
the returns is 1 − r2n−1
∏
ci and we can choose r close enough to 1 to make this difference
negative. So we have a collective Dutch Book.
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but if a world is Doom Later in dimension i, then an observer can be either low
rank or high rank (rank 1) in dimension i43.
Each observer consists of 2n observer-moments. We might use an n bi-
nary digit number to characterize the observer-moments belonging to a given
observer. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if the ith digit of the number characterizing an
observer-moment is zero, then the observer-moment does not know her rank in
dimension i, but if the digit is 1, then she does.
The scenario we have constructed is a scenario involving n independent rep-
etitions of the Doomsday Argument scenario. It is important here when we
try to justify our relative frequency argument that we are really dealing with
independent experiments. This scenario really does involve n truly independent
repetitions of identical Doomsday Argument scenarios.44
Assume n is very large. Then the probability that the actual world is Doom
Soon in approximately half its dimensions is very close to 1. Thus a typical world
will have about as many Doom Soon as Doom Later dimensions. Now consider a
typical observer in such a typical world. In about half the dimensions the world
is Doom Soon and of course the observer is low rank in these dimensions. In the
other half of the dimension the world is Doom Later and in those dimensions
there are as many low rank as high rank observers. Thus a typical observer will
be low rank in about half the dimensions in which the world is Doom Later and
that means a typical observer in a typical world will be low rank in Doom Later
in about one fourth of the dimensions. Hence in approximately two thirds of
the dimensions in which she is low rank, the world will turn out to be Doom
Soon.
Notice that if we are a typical observer-moment belonging to a typical ob-
server in a typical world and use maximal reference classes and the SSSA and
do not apply the SIA and for a dimension i in which we know our rank is low,
we try to estimate the probability that the actual world is Doom Soon in di-
mension i, we will obtain a posterior probability estimate of 23 . So we will be
well-calibrated.
43We could easily generalize our scenario to allow low ranks to range from 1 to M and high
rank from M + 1 to N .
44Repeated Sleeping Beauty scenarios discussed in the literature(for example in [Bos07,
Arn02]) do not really involve independent repetitions. We might consider n different variat-
tions of our simple Sleeping Beauty scenario in which a drug is given either once or twice. The
only real difference between these variations is that a slightly different drug is administered to
Beauty in each variant, a different coin is flipped and the drug is administered during different
weeks. In fact n different drugs are given in n successive weeks. But then if we consider just
one particular drug, any day of Beauty’s life is a either the first day during which Beauty
is under the influence of the drug, the second day during which she is under the influence,
or a day during which she is not under the influence. But whether or not she is under the
influence of one drug is not indepedent of whether or not she is under the influence of an-
other drug. Our repeated Sleeping Beauty scenario involves different drugs, but we might
imagine that the effects of these different drugs on Beauty’s subjective psychological state are
indistinguishable. The fact that different drugs were involved during different weeks will not
affect Beauty’s probability estimates when guessing what happened when coins were tossed.
So we really are discussing the same Repeated Sleeping Beauty scenario that is discussed in
the literature. And we do not have independence(See also [Kad04] for a discussion of the lack
of independence.
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We can modify our scenario so that observer-moments will even be able to
learn that they will be well-calibrated if they believe the Doomsday Argument
conclusion that the probability of Doom Soon is NM+N . (In this section we are
letting N = 2 and M = 1.) Let each observer in the (unrepeated) Dooms-
day Argument scenario consist of three not two observer-moments. The third
observer-moment knows both her rank and whether the actual world is Doom
Soon or Doom Later. The other two observer-moment are just as in the earlier
version of the scenario. The third moment knows (remembers) any probabil-
ity estimates made by the second moment of the same observer. The repeated
version of this scenario is just like the repeated version described above except
that moments belonging to a given observer are characterized by a ternary, not
binary digit number of length n. Thus if n is large enough, a typical observer-
moment will come to realize that she is well-calibrated if she guesses two-third
when asked to estimate a probability for Doom Soon in a dimension in which
she knows she is low rank but does not know if the world is Doom Soon or
Doom Later in that Dimension.
We have discussed a relative frequency argument for a particular scenario,
but we should remember that if we are to have confidence that a theory of an-
thropic reasoning really works, we will have to apply that theory many times
to many different problems. So we might use actual rather than hypothetical
relative frequencies to justify our belief in a certain approach to anthropic rea-
soning. It will be easier to rely on these actual relative frequencies if we are
computing relative frequencies of useful predictions in independent experiments.
So it is important that in our repeated Doomsday Argument scenario, we are
dealing with independent dimensions.
9.3 Reference Classes are Not Too Big
It might be objected that our reference classes are too large if we use maximal
reference classes as the previous section recommended. In order to calculate a
posterior probability estimate for some (bare) possible world being actual, do
we really have to know about the number of observer-moments in some distant
galaxy, especially if intelligent life in that galaxy has a very different psychology
than human psychology? The answer is, in principle, yes, we do. That is
unfortunate, but that is the way it is. If we know very little about that distant
galaxy, we might make some simplifying assumptions because that is the best we
can do. But we make similar simplifying assumptions when using nonanthropic
reasoning to evaluate cosmological theories or even to predict future events here
on earth. There is often a large collection of factors that could affect the value
of some variable of interest to us and some of these factors might be obscure
and difficult to investigate so we make simplifying assumptions.
In any case our maximal reference classes are not all that big. They are
not universal reference classes. We require that all z ∈ W∗ could agree on a
nonathropic prior P on W . And of course, all z ∈W∗ have to be able to actually
be observer-moments with respect to the contextW∗. Perhaps we and some very
alien observer-moments living in another galaxy have fundamental intuitions
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that are so different that we and they could never agree on a reasonable P or
we might not be able to reason coherently about the hypothetical possibility
that we are just like those aliens from the other galaxy.
There is also a less speculative and fantastic way in which our maximal
reference classes are not too large. We might consider whole communities or
even whole civilizations as if they were observers. There is such a things as
group belief, group intention, group utility[Gil89]. But our reference classes do
not have to include both individual observers or observer-moments and group
observers or observer-moments.
To see why we might exclude either group or individual observer-moments
from our reference class, note that the beliefs and desires of a group are very
much not independent of the beliefs and desires of its members. Moreover it
might not be possible for either groups or individuals to reason coherently about
a hypothetical situation where they do not know whether they are an individual
or a group. In addition, there might be some (nonanthropic) issues about which
only whole civilizations and not individual scientists can (or truly want to)
reason coherently; cosmology might be so difficult for individual scientists and
maybe it is not the preferred goal of the individual scientist to seek and advocate
the truth as best she can; instead it might be the preferred goal that she do
her part in helping the consensus of the scientific community as a whole to
eventually come much closer to the truth and that, given human limitations,
might require her to advocate incredible, but heuristically fruitful hypotheses,
for example, and really belief these hypotheses and conduct research as if she
believed these hypotheses. If on some issues only the community as a whole is
rational, then on some issues we will be working with a reference class consisting
just of whole civilizations rather than every single observer-moment45
10 The Infinite Case
Up until now we have only considered the case where W∗ is finite. Thus the
number of worlds that have observers is finite and in each such world the number
of atomic moments is finite (or the total amount of information that can be
represented by all the observer-moments in a given world is finite). The infinite
case is much harder and it is less simple to come up with a good prior for the
infinite case just based on general theoretical principles and a good nonanthropic
prior.
We still want to be able to say that if i and j are atomic observer-moments
belonging to the same possible world they should have equal prior probabilities
but that assumption is not as useful or convenient or even convincing as it was
in the finite case. Even if we accept this equal probability assumption, many
probability estimates remain undetermined even given the nonanthropic prior.
But we expect infinities to create problems for us. They create problems
45Thus Vilenkin[Vil95]’s principle of mediocrity according to which we should reason as if
we were a random civilization might make sense.
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for nonanthropic scenarios46 . The usual way of handling an infinite case is
to treat it as a limit of finite cases that we can handle. The problem is that
there are many ways of representing an infinite case as a limit of finite cases and
not all ways result in equivalent probability estimates. We might well expect
there will be no good theoretical guidelines for choosing a particular preferred
way to represent the infinite as a limit of the finite. We might have to learn
from experience just how to represent the infinite. The measure problem might
ultimately be an empirical problem.
We can just say a few things about how we might represent an infinite case
as a limit of finite approximations. If we ignore certain observers or observer-
moments, our scenario might become simpler. So if we approximate an infinite
case by saying that an infinity of the observer-moments should be given proba-
bility zero and only a finite number will have nonzero probability, then we have
a more tractable approximation. Another way to approximate the infinite by
the finite is to use equivalence classes of observer-moments and equivalence class
of possible worlds. So we refuse to distinguish between possible worlds that are
in fact actually distinct and refuse to distinguish between observer-moments
within a given possible world that are in fact distinct. If we have only a finite
number of equivalence classes of possible worlds and within each equivalence
class only a finite number of equivalence classes of observer-moments then we
are dealing with a finite case. Our finite approximations could also involve both
equivalence classes and consider only a finite subset to be interesting.
Once we have constructed a set of finite approximations, some of which
are more accurate approximations than others, we might be able to express an
infinite case as a limit of an infinite series of finite approximations. The main
issue is which finite approximations are most relevant and how do we express
the infinite as a limit of the finite. Aside from saying that our approximation
procedure and our procedure for choosing how to express the infinite as a limit of
the finite approximations must seem simple and natural and lead to intuitively
reasonable results, there is nothing much more that will be said about the infinite
case in this paper. The key idea here anyway is that there is much that must
be learned from experience.
11 Learning How to Reason Anthropically from
Experience
There are many possible procedures for estimating probabilities in anthropic
scenarios. Different researchers have recommended the use of different theories.
46Consider, for example, [Jay03]’s discussion of marginalization paradoxes. We might also
think about something as simple as the need for improper priors and the problems they might
cause; if we want to say that we are picking a positive integer at random and all positive
integers are equally likely to be selected, we need to use an improper prior. Now I might
say conditionalize on the information that the number that was selected was divisible by 3
and ask for the probability that the number chosen was even. There is no uniquely justified
probability estimate here. It depends upon how we analyze this infinite scenario as a limit of
finite scenarios.
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Disagrement on handling anthropic scearios continues to exist even under the
assumption of universal agreement about nonanthropic cases. We definitely do
have to reason anthropically even if reasoning anthropically only means ignoring
the anthropic information or using the minimal reference class or following some
simple procedure for replacing an anthropic by a nonanthropic scenario.
We might think that anthropic reasoning has been falsified by experience[Olu04]
because in fact we are not typical in a certain respect. But of course everyone
and every possible world is atypical in some respect[HM05]. If we have to choose
a twenty digit number at random we might pick some number s that is atypical
in that it is the only number equal to s (and we might even discover a less
gerrymandered way of expressing the atypicality of our having selected s). But
what matters is being atypical in interesting respects. What if it turns out that
s = 11, 111, 111, 111, 111, 111, 111? This s is atypical in an interesting respect
in that its atypicality is defined by a property that might be likely to occur to
us before the number was selected. However, it is still possible that we might
seem to be atypical in some interesting respect. That would not mean that an-
thropic reasoning has been falsified, just that we might need to define a different
formulation for anthropic reasoning and a different analysis of what it means to
be atypical. Maybe if i and j belong to the same world, Pz(i) and Pz(j) should
not be considered equal. There is still much unexplored space in the realm of
theories of anthropic reasoning. And, of course, we should expect that there is
someone in the actual world who actually is atypical in an interesting respect.
All we can assume is that there is low prior probability of our turning out to be
atypical in an interesting respect.
In any case, we know how to test theories of anthropic reasoning using stan-
dard Bayesian methodology. If X is a theory of anthropic reasoning that is suffi-
ciently precise that given a nonanthropic prior probability distribution all neces-
sary posterior probabilities can be calculated for relevant observer-moments, we
know that although there might be strong arguments in favor of X, these argu-
ments will not be incontrovertible and will not be based on pure logical analysis.
There will be some element of intuition about naturalness, simplicity or some
other doubtable assumption involved. The arguments might be very convincing
but there will still be some chance that X is incorrect. Researchers might dif-
fer as to what this chance is, but they should all agree that it is meaningfully
greater than 0 and less than 1.
There might be many reasonable theories of anthropic reasoning that are
in contention. Certainly there are several possible approaches to handling the
infinite case. We might need to choose between two competing theories X and
Y of anthropic reasoning. An observer-moment would choose based on the ev-
idence E she has available. Based on intuition, based on general nonanthropic
considerations, based even on some anthropic evidence obtained prior to the
acquisition of evidence E, one might have some prior probabilities for the like-
lihoods of X and Y . Thus we are using an actual prior knowledge state or a
hypothetical prior knowledge state representing what we would know if we did
not know E to estimate a prior probability for X and for Y . There might be
some lack of clarity or controversy about what these prior probabilities should
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be. Intuitions are not always clear. Thus we might have to work with ranges
of values rather than specific prior values. Based on X or Y (our theories for
computing anthropic probabilities), we can compute a probability for E given
X and for E given Y . Then we can just apply Bayes’ rule and hope that the
evidence E will be decisive enough that regardless of where in the range of pos-
sibilities the priors for X and Y lay, one of the two competing metatheories is
strongly preferred over the other.
12 When to Ignore Distinctions
In this section, we explore equivalence relations and when it is possible to cor-
rectly estimate posterior probabilities while ignoring distinctions between equiv-
alent observer-moments. First some notation. If ≡ is an equivalence relation
on W∗ and A ⊂ W∗, we write A≡ for the closure of A under ≡ and A mod ≡
for A modulo the equivalence relation ≡. Thus x ∈ A≡ if and only if there
exists y ∈ A with y ≡ x and g ∈ A mod ≡ if and only if g is an equivalence
class modulo ≡ and g ∩A 6= ∅. We shall write x≡ rather than {x}≡ in the case
of a singleton set. If z ∈ W∗, we can extend Pz so that Pz(A) is defined for
any A ⊆ W∗ by setting Pz(A) = Pz(A ∩ Rz). This is equivalent to enlarging
the reference class Rz to all of W∗ but giving zero probability to all sets of
observer-moments that do not intersect Rz. We can easily define a prior prob-
ability distribution, which we will represent by Pz even if this is an abuse of
notation, on W ∗mod ≡; just set Pz(A mod ≡) = Pz(A≡) for A ⊆W∗.
What we really want to know is when
Pz(A≡|(Kz)≡) = Pz(A|Kz). (1)
Equation 1 is stated in terms of closures but there is an equivalent equation
that can be written that relates conditional probabilities of equivalence classes.
It is just more convenient to discuss closures than equivalence classes.
The distinction between observer-moments that belong to the same equiva-
lence class is not supposed to matter so we shall assume that we only care about
sets A that are closed under ≡. (A≡ = A.)
By definition of conditional probability, equation 1 is equivalent to
Pz(A≡ ∩ (Kz)≡)
Pz((Kz)≡)
=
Pz(A ∩Kz)
Pz(Kz)
. (2)
Assuming Pz(A∩Kz) 6= 0, we know that Pz(A≡∩(Kz)≡) 6= 0 and we can derive
Pz(A ∩Kz)
Pz(A ∩ (Kz)≡) =
Pz(Kz)
Pz((Kz)≡)
(3)
where we have taken into account that A≡ = A. Equation 3 just says that if
we select an element at random from (Kz)≡, the probability that the element
actually belongs to the knowledge set Kz does not depend on whether the chosen
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element belongs to the set A. Here the random selection was done using the
probability distribution Pz.
Equation 3 will be true for example if for all equivalence classes g inKzmod ≡,
the probability that a random element of g actually belongs to Kz is the same.
Let us examine some important special cases. Let x ≡ y if and only if
x∗ = y∗. (So to be equivalent, observer-moments must belong to the same
world. And there is a correspondence between equivalence classes of observer-
moments and uncentered worlds. So when we ask for the posterior probability
of A = A≡, we are asking for a posterior probability for a set of possible worlds.
) Assume if w is a world consistent with Kz (a world that for all z knows might
be actual), the probability is k that a random observer-moment y ∈ w∗ actually
belongs to Kz (for all z knows she could be y if y ∈ Kz) where k is a constant.
Then equation 3 and hence equation 1 is satisfied.
This might happen if we have reasonable counting measure | | on observer-
moments in a given world (for example the total amount of information repre-
sented or the total number of atomic moments) such that for all worlds w that for
all z knows might be actual, the count |w∗ | is the same and the count |w∗∩Kz|
is the same (for example it might always equal 1. This is saying that all worlds
consistent with z’s knowledge have the same number of observer-moments and
in every such world there is a constant number of observer-moments such that
for all z knows she could be they. Even if this is not exactly true, it might be
approximately correct and thus show why we can often ignore strictly anthropic
information when reasoning about (bare) possible worlds.
We are also interested in the equivalence relation that considers two observer-
moments to be equal if and only if they belong to the same observer in the
same world. Assume once again that we have a reasonable way of counting
observer-moments such as total amount of information or total number of atomic
moments. We also require that for any o and w such that for all z knows she
might be a part of o in w, the count of observer-moments in o in w is the
same. Finally assume that if for all z knows she might be o in w, the number of
observer-moments y in o in w such that for all z knows she might be y does not
depend on o and w. This is saying that |o| and |o∩Kz| is the same for all such o
and w. We can then derive the result that we (i.e. z) can safely ignore temporal
location information, if we have a question about which world is actual or about
our identity but do not really care what time it is.
We can now see why it is often possible to estimate approximately cor-
rect posterior probabilities by conditionalizing a chronological prior. It is true
enough that almost always if t2 is a later time than t1, we will have lost some in-
formation between t1 and t2 and strictly speaking if information is lost, between
t1 and t2, it would not be correct to conditionalize our probability distribution
at time t1 on the knowledge acquired in the time between t1 and t2. But the
information lost might be irrelevant information.
We might at t1 know the current time is t1 and at t2 we do not know that
the current time is t1 but temporal location might be irrelevant. We might at t2
knows some nonanthropic information E that we did not know at t1. So we lost
the information that we did not E. However even if E might be very relevant
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information, whether or not we know E might not be relevant information. In
the Doomsday Argument scenario, information about birth rank is very relevant
to estimation of the probability of Doom Soon but information about whether
one knows one’s birth rank is not relevant.
If we do not lose relevant information between t1 and t2, then we should
be able to conditionalize our probability distribution at t1 on the knowledge
acquired between t1 and t2.
Let y and z be two different observer-moments in the same possible world.
We would like to show that z can compute her relevant posterior probabilities
by starting with a distribution representing y’s relevant knowledge and then
conditionalizing this distribution on the relevant knowledge that z has and y
lacks. We let ≡ represent the equivalence relation such that x ≡ s if and only
if x and s belong to the same observer in the same possible world. We are
interested in the posterior probability Pz(A|Kz) for some set A ⊆ W∗ with
A = A≡. We would like to show that this posterior probability estimate can be
obtained by conditionalization of y’s relevant prior if (Kz)≡ ⊆ (Ky)≡. (Thus
no relevant information known to y is not known to z.)
The distribution P y representing y’s relevant knowledge is defined by
P y(B) = P y(B≡|(Ky)≡) (4)
for all B ⊆W∗. So we would like to be able to say that
Pz(A|Kz) = P y(A|(Kz)≡). (5)
But
P y(A|(Kz)≡) = P
y(A ∩ (Kz)≡)
P y((Kz)≡)
(6)
and
P y(A ∩ (Kz)≡) = Py(A ∩ (Kz)≡)
Py((Ky)≡)
(7)
and
P y((Kz)≡) =
Py((Kz)≡)
Py((Ky)≡
(8)
where we have used the fact that (Kz)≡ ∩ (Ky)≡ = (Kz)≡.
Thus
P y(A|(Kz)≡) = Py(A ∩ (Kz)≡
Py((Kz)≡)
(9)
.
If we assume that y and z use the same priors and thus Py = Pz, the right
hand side of equation 9 is just Pz(A|(Kz)≡).
Therefore if equation 1 is true of A and z and ≡, then it is permissible for z
to obtain her relevant posterior by conditionalizing y’s relevant posterior (which
z will treat as a prior) on the (relevant) knowledge that z has and y does not.
This proof did not really depend on any chronological relationship between
y and z nor do y and z have to belong to the same observer in the same world.
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But our assumption of no loss of relevant information is most plausible if z
occurs after y and z and y belong to the same observer.
13 Anthropic Causal Decision Theory
So far we have only considered scenarios in which observer-moments have to
estimate probabilities or make decisions that do not affect the total number of
observer-moments that exist in the actual world. But certainly people can cause
other people to die or cause other people to be born. People may not be able to
figure out the long range consequences of performing actions that will have the
effect of shortening their own or someone else length of life or the long range
consequences of performing actions that will cause people to be born. Maybe
the long range consequence of my shooting a dictator and his most powerful
subordinates might be to increase the total number of observer-moments that
will exist in the actual world. Maybe the long range consequence of my choosing
to have twenty children is to decrease the total number of people who will ever be
born. Even governments may make mistakes when they engage in pronatalist
or population control policies domestically or internationally. But even if we
cannot know for sure what the consequences are of such actions we can take
actions that do affect the total number of observer-moments that will ever live
on earth and we can make probabilistic statements about the consequences of
such actions. So we do need a theory that will allow us to reason about which
decisions we should making when decisions might affect the total number47 of
observer-moments that will ever live.
Scenarios even more troublingly paradoxical than the Doomsday Argument
scenario can be constructed if we allow observers to make decisions that affect
the total number of observer-moments who exist. We might consider a modified
version of the Lazy Adam scenario of Bostrom[Bos02a].
There are two possible worlds Doom Soon and Doom Later48. In Doom Soon
worlds there is only one observer. In Doom Later worlds there are N observers
with N much greater than 1 (e.g. 10100). All observers in both kinds of worlds
consist of the same number of observer-moments. There are two kinds of Doom
Soon worlds, worlds in which event E happens and worlds in which event E
does not happens. There are also two kinds of Doom Later worlds, worlds in
which E happens (but in some versions of our scenario there will not actually
be any Doom Later worlds with E occurring) and worlds in which E does not
happen. The event E might be an event that there are good nonanthropic reason
to believe rather improbable, for example throwing a fair coin 100 times and
obtaining heads each time or a wounded but otherwise healthy deer wandering
into the backyard of the observer with birth rank 1 (call this observer Adam)
on a certain specific day without any effort on Adam’s part.
At some time before the time at which event E might occur, Adam has a
47the total number according to some reasonable counting measure
48Actually these are equivalence classes of worlds and later we shall have to distinguish
between worlds within the same equivalence class.
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decision to make. If he chooses option A, the actual world will be Doom Soon.
If he chooses option B and E does occur the actual world will be Doom Soon.
If he chooses option B and E does not occur, then the actual world will be
Doom Later49 Whatever actions are involved in choosing A or B do not seem to
affect whether E occurs. The decision might be a choice to make or not make
an irrevocable resolution to push a button of a cloning machine (a machine that
will clone Adam) if E does not occur.
On strictly nonanthropic grounds the probability that E occurs given Adam
makes the choice A is very small. His option A does not affect how a fair coin
lands or where a deer chooses to visit. Nor should his choice B affect whether or
not E occurs. Thus we would conclude that using only nonanthropic information
that if Adam chooses B, then there is a very high probability that E does not
occur and that the actual world is Doom Later. But this is a nonanthropic
probability estimate. Adam might want to revise this nonanthropic estimate to
take into account the fact that he is Adam, the observer with birth rank 1. The
nonanthropic probability of Doom Later given choice B is made is very high but
given that it is very atypical for a random observer in Doom Later to have rank
1 but in Doom Soon there is only one observer, a Doomsday Argument will show
that given that choice B is made, Adam should believe that the probability of
Doom Soon and hence of E happening is very high. Adam wants E to happen
and thus it would seem he would make choice B and thus Adam can be almost
certain that E will happen even if it is an event like a fair coin landing heads a
hundred times in a row.
If we ignore the issue of whether Adam should choose option B and just
assume that Adam is under a compulsion to choose B, a compulsion that is
irresistable and that every observer knows that Adam has this compulsion and
that the compulsion is irresistable, we are not in a situation at all very different
than the standard Doomsday Argument scenario (we might even imagine their is
a phase early in all observers’ lives when they are totally ignorant of their birth
rank). It should not matter the exact mechanism that is responsible for the fact
that the actual world is Doom Soon rather than Doom Later or vice versa. It
should not matter whether that mechanism involved purely cosmological events
or also involved the actions of observers such as Adam. It should not matter
that Adam has a strong preference that the actual world be Doom Soon. There
is nothing really new here. And nothing changes that much if there is some
49A more sophisticated version of this scenario stipulates that the relation between whether
E occurs, Adam’s decision and whether the actual world is a Doom Soon or Doom Later world
is stochastic. Adam can try to force the actual world to be a Doom Later world whenever
E does not occur, but he cannot be absolutely sure he will succeed. Adam might correctly
believe that if he chooses A, the actual world is most likely to be Doom Soon but he cannot
know for sure that it will be Doom Soon.
In Bostrom’s Lazy Adam scenario, the decision involves an irrevocable resolution to repro-
duce if it is discovered that E does not occur and one might wonder if one can make such an
irrevocable resolution[Cir04]. (But one might push a button on a computer that will assess
whether E occurs and if necessary force Adam to reproduce.) And even if one cannot make a
perfectly irrevocable decision, one might be able to make a resolution that is not very likely
to be revoked.
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stochastic process that determines whether Adam succombs to the compulsion
to choose B or actually chooses A. Adam is part of nature. Adam can still
calculate nonanthropic and anthropic probabilities for Doom Soon. We find
Adam’s high probability estimate for Doom Soon and hence for E troubling.
But what we are really troubled by is the sharp difference between anthropic
and nonanthropic probabilities.
We can also consider a kind of repeated Lazy Adam scenario, which is even
more troubling. Possible worlds have S binary digit id numbers. The number of
observers who live in a world with id number x is Nx
+
where x+ is the number
of nonzero digits in x. But we are primarily concerned with Adam, the observer
with rank 1. There are for 1 ≤ i ≤ S, events Ei that might or might not
occur and associated with each event is a decision for Adam to make. Adam
can choose either Ai or Bi. Adam must make the choice before he has any
chance to observe whether or not Ei occurs. If Adam chooses Ai or if Adam
chooses Bi and Ei occurs, then the ith digit of the number of the actual world
is 0. Otherwise the ith digit is 1. Adam is under an irresistable compulsion
to choose Ai for i ∈ C and Bi for i 6∈ C where C is some subset of the set of
integers between 1 and S such that the fraction of S that belongs to C is around
one-half. The nonanthropic probabilities for the actual world being a world in
which Ei occurs are very small for all i and these nonanthropic probabilities
are independent. But once Adam takes into account his knowledge of birth
rank, he will conclude that if i ∈ C, then almost certainly Ei did occur but if
i 6∈ C almost certainly Ei did not occur. This seems a strange coincidence. But
we could have a similar strange coincidence without any connection with any
decision-making of Adam’s. What if all the Ei were cosmological events and
that these were actually rather similar events but only if i 6∈ C does event Ei not
occurring cause the actual world to have digit 1 in the ith dimension and for all
the other i, the digit is 0. Adam would still notice the same strange discrepency
between the objective improbability of all the Ei and high probability of only
those Ei whose nonoccurance would cause the number of observer-moments
to be multiplied by N . This is basically just the same discrepency between
anthropic and nonanthropic probability that we have seen before arises in the
Doomsday Argument scenario. Once we have an anomaly we can often play
around with the anomaly and make it arise in a strange pattern of places but
there is nothing really new here.
But the issue arises: Should Adam in the original Lazy Adam scenario choose
A or B. If the choice of A or B does not really affect objectively (does not
affect the nonanthropic probability of) the likelihood of E occurring, perhaps
we should want to conclude that it does not matter if Adam chooses A or B
so why not choose B. But to make matters more interesting we assume there is
a cost associated with chosing B rather than A. A fairly large cost but a cost
that Adam is willing to pay if he could cause it to be the case that E is highly
likely to occur rather than highly unlikely. We might also make things more
interesting by assuming that Adam has to choose A or B before he knows that
he is Adam (and we assume that this choice has no effect when made by an
observer other than Adam).
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I think it is fairly clear that Adam should choose A not B. A good version
of causal decision theory should tell us why. The basic idea is when deciding
whether to choose A or B Adam should ask himself: If I choose A in the actual
world, would I be better off than if I had chosen B and if I chose B in the actual
world, would I be better off than if I had chosen A50. If the answer to the first
question is yes and the second no, then A is to be preferred. If the answers are
no and yes, then B is to be preferred. If both answers are no or both answers
are yes, then more reasoning needs to be done. We are in a sort of paradoxical
situation.
In order to help him to decide what utility he would have if he had made a
certain choice, a basic insight that Adam can use is that if in the actual world
he is the observer with rank 1, he would still be the observer with rank 1 if he
had made a decision different than the decision that he actually made.
Consider now the situation where Adam chooses A (actually chooses A).
And E does not occur. His choosing B would not cause him not to have birth
rank 1 or cause E to occur. It would just cause Doom Later to be actual rather
than Doom Soon and there would be a cost associated with choosing B so
B should not be chosen. But note that this argument involved a comparison
between an actually possible world in the set W and some hypothetical world,
which might not be part of W . In fact Adam might be compelled to choose A by
a law of nature but we could still reason counterfactually about the consequences
of having made the impossible choice B.
Consider next the situation where Adam chooses B (actually chooses B).
And E does occur. His choosing A would save him a cost and not prevent him
from having birth rank one or prevent E from occurring. So B should not be
chosen.
Certainly if Adam chooses A and E does occur, then he would not be better
off if he had chosen B (and E would occur anyway). And if Adam chooses B
and E does not occur, then that is not something he wants so he might as well
have chosen A.
Thus no matter which world is actual, it is best if Adam chooses A.
The Lazy Adam scenario is only one example of a scenario where making a
decision is not so simple and the difference between epistemic and causal decision
theory might matter[Joy99]. We need to investigate how we might adjust causal
decision theory so that we can handle problems involving decisions that might
affect the number of observer-moments in the universe. A sketch of a theory is
presented below.
13.1 Sketch of an Anthropic Causal Decision Theory
We consider an observer-moment z ∈ W∗ who is making a decision D. We
assume that the decision is a decision between a finite number S of alternatives.
We call the alteratives Di for 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|. The decision D might be an actual
50Of course, Adam does not know which world is actual so we might have to talk about
expected utilities and about whether Adam could on average expect to be better off rather
than whether he is actually better off or not.
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decision that z is faced with or some hypothetical decision problem might be
involved. Since we do not want the mere fact that she is faced with making the
decision D to give z any knowledge about her location within the set Kz, we
must assume that all observer-moments in Kz are faced with a similar decision
problem. In fact, we can assume that all y ∈ Kz are faced with decision D.
We want to analyze the effect of z’s decision on her utility. Unfortunately
in general her utility might depend not just on her own decision but on the
decisions of other y ∈ Kz. That complicates the analysis. So we shall only treat
the simple case where there is at most one element of Kz in each w ∈W or we
assume that the effects on utility of different decisions by different members of
Kz ∩w are independent. Thus even if x and y are both in world w and both in
Kz, the difference in utility x would obtain by choosing Di rather than Dj for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ S is independent of the choice made by y 6= x.
Under these assumptions, we can define a function U : Kz × S → R. Here
U(y, i) is supposed to represent the utility for observer-moment y in choosing
Di if it were faced with decision problem D51. In order to compute U(y, i), we
have to determine which possible world would result if y in world w were faced
with D and chose Di. We might choose the world closest (in some sense) to
w among those worlds in which y chooses Di. That world might be w itself
or it might be some other world and we can then determine the utility of y in
w or in the other world. Or there might not be one single definite world that
would have resulted if y chose Di; if y chose Di, that would set in motion a
stochastic process that does not occur in w and there is not enough information
in w to tell us what the result of the stochastic process would be. So we might
be dealing with a probability distribution over counterfactual possible worlds.
But in that case we could compute the utility of y in these worlds and then
compute an expected value. In any case, we could compute a value for U(y, i).
All we need is that we can determine the utility that would have been obtained
by y if she were faced with D and chose Di. It is not necessary that we use a
closest possible world approach to interpreting counterfactuals.
Now what z has to do is fairly clear. She has to evaluate the expected utility∑
y∈Kz Pz(y|Kz)U(y, i) for all i and chose the i that maximizes this expected
utility. The problem lies with the Pz(y|Kz). If Adam has to decide between A
and B at a time when he does not know who he is, then if y is an observer-
moment that is not part of Adam, how can Adam give a probability value for
Pz(y|Kz)? Whether Doom Later exists depends on how Adam decides and thus
whether y exists can depend on a decision of Adam’s. In fact it might depend
on the very decision problem D that Adam (and every other observer-moment
in the same knowledge state as he) is in the process of trying to solve.
Adam might try to make a psychological model of how he and other observer-
moments in the same knowledge state would most probably make their deci-
sions52. Fortunately, in the Lazy Adam scenario, the exact numbers do not
51It is assumed that all x ∈ Ky knows the value of U(y, i); they know the utility they would
be obtain by choosing Di if they were observer-moment y.
52Actually, as we shall see below, Adam needs a probability distribution over S. It might
matter exactly how likely each Di is to be the choice that is actually made. But for simplicity,
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matter. No matter what probabilities we use for our Pz(y|Kz), we know Adam
would be better off or at least as well off choosing A. In general, there is a poten-
tial difficulty because there might be problems where if Adam thinks it likely he
will make choice A, then he should make choice B and vice versa[Ega07]. Thus
Adam cannot make a choice that he will not later regret.
It is not entirely clear what we should do if we wish to avoid making a
decision that we shall regret, but in a context where anthropic reasoning is not
a concern, Arntzenius has suggested a possible solution[Arn08]. Inspired by his
work, we might suggest the following partial solution.
We start with a theory of psychology which tells us how observer-moments
in Kz would decide when faced with D. This would allow us to calculate the
Pz we need. Then we might figure out an optimal decision. However, if there is
a difference between our initial psychological theory about how likely each Di
is to be chosen and our theory as to which Di is best to chose, then there is a
problem. Thus if our theory is that all observer-moments would choose Di and
we use that theory to obtain a Pz and use that Pz when computing expected
utilities and then determine that Di is really not optimal, we lack stability and
there is a problem.
Another possible problem is that there might be i 6= j such that if we
start with a psychological theory that says that observer-moments in Kz would
select Di, we will discover that Di is optimal but if we start with a theory that
observer-moments will prefer Dj , we will discover that Dj is optimal. So there
might be multiple stable solutions. We will not discuss how to choose in that
case. Perhaps we know something about the psychology of observer-moments
other than their rationality and this knowledge might help to choose between the
different stable solutions. One solution might be simpler or seem more natural.
Even if we do not have a theory for the multiple stable solution case, we
have a possible remedy if there are no stable solutions. We can expand the
space of possible solutions. Instead of choosing a Di, we choose a probability
distribution over the Di. We start with a psychological theory that gives a
probability distribution pi over the Di.53 Based on that theory we compute a
Pz and then we might discover that for any i such that pi(Di) 6= 0, Di is as good
a choice as any other choice and thus we cannot improve on the probabalistic
choice that select each Di with probability pi(Di)54. Again it is possible that
there are several mixed strategies that are stable.
14 Conclusion
We have seen that a simple and natural theory of anthropic reasoning can be
constructed based on Bostrom’s Strong Self-Sampling Assumption. In the fi-
we assume at first that the psychological theory picks out a unique Di.
53So the theory say we should a randomizing device to help us make our choice.
54And that does not mean that it would necessarily be acceptable to make a definite choice
of one of the Di with pi(Di) 6= 0 because that choice might not be stable. If we used the
psychological theory that Di would be chosen to help compute a Pz , we would eventually find
out that observer-moments have a better option available than Di.
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nite case, there are good Dutch Book arguments as well as relative frequency
arguments in favor of using maximal reference classes and giving every atomic
observer-moment in the same possible world equal prior probability. If we find
unrealistic the notion of atomic moment we can just realize that the measure
given to a moment is proportional to the logarithm of the number of distinct
subjective psychological states it can represent.
This theory of anthropic reasoning is simple and does not require we use the
Self-Indication assumption. In fact some of the same arguments that advocates
of the SIA could use against our theory of anthropic reasoning could be used
against the SIA as it is usually made precise and in favor of a strong version of
the SIA. Furthermore some of the ratioale for the SIA fails to take into account
that each observer-moment is making its own decisions independently. So it
does not matter if it would be better if everyone applied the SIA rather than
no one did. What matters is holding constant what other observer-moments do
whether it is desirable for an individual moment to apply the SIA.
A natural theory of anthropic decision making, which is really a kind of
anthropic causual decision theory can be defined which enables us to make
intuitively natural decisions in scenarios like the Lazy Adam scenario. The
basic idea is that if an observer-moment had made a decision other than the
decision she actually made she would still be the same observer-moment.
Our theory seems to work reasonably well in the finite case even if we have
to acknowledge that the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument, an argument
that our theory says is valid, is rather counterintuitive. Any theory of anthropic
reasoning that is sufficiently general and non-ad hoc will have some counterin-
tuitive consequences.
Our theory does not really tell us very much about how to define a prior
probability distribution in the infinite case; it just says represent the infinite as
the limit of the finite but does not really say how. This is an crucial lacuna. The
actual world might be a world with an infinity of (atomic) observer-moments
and it might be very true that if we try to reason about the actual world as if
it contained only a finite number of relevant observer-moments, we will make
some very wrong probability estimates. We might not be able to ignore the
infinite size of the universe.
Another problem is that we are depending on the existence of a reliable and
well-justified nonanthropic prior probability that can be used by all observer-
moments in all worlds. The very idea of separation of the nonanthropic and
anthropic part of an estimation of probabilities might be mistaken. It might
not be the simplest procedure. It might be too difficult to come up with a nat-
ural prior that can be used by all observer-moments. When we know very little
(we only can take into account what all observer-moments know when creating
a nonanthropic prior), we might not provknow enough to derive a meaningful
prior. It might be the case that we should not first try to obtain a simple nonan-
thropic prior and then apply a simple theory of anthropic reasoning. Instead
we might from the start have to acknowledge that the anthropic and nonan-
thropic might be mixed up and might have to be generated as a unit. Maybe
all we really want is the simplest probabilistic explanation of the data we actu-
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ally have[Hut04, Hut10]. All a theory really needs to do is explain the data we
actually have and make (probabilistic) predictions of the data we might acquire
if we perform certain experiments or follow certain protocols. It is possible that
the simplest way of accomplishing that task and the preferred way of achieving
that task is not to first create a nonanthropic prior and then to conditionalize
on the anthropic information we do have.
Another topic that needs investigating is constructing hyperpriors. We have
discussed how we might learn from experience which anthropic reasoning theory
is to be preferred and that would includes learning from experience how to
handle infinities but that requires we have some way of generating reasonable
hyperpriors on proposed theories of anthropic reasoning. We need to analyze
how that might be done in some precise, non-ad hoc way rather than just say
that we prefer simple and natural theories. We might have to deal with a range
of reasonable hyperpriors but that might be the best we can do.
References
[AEH04] Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga, , and John Hawthorne. Bayesianism,
infinite decisions, and binding. Mind, 113(450):251–283, 2004.
[Arn02] Frank Arntzenius. Reflections on Sleeping Beauty. Analysis, 62(1):53–
62, 2002.
[Arn08] Frank Arntzenius. No regrets: Edith Piaf revamps decision theory.
Erkentnis, 68(2):277 – 297, 2008.
[BC03] Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. The doomsday argument and the
self-indication assumption:reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly,
53(210):83–91, 2003.
[BL06] Darren Bradley and Hannes Leitgeb. When betting odds and cre-
dences come apart:more worries for Dutch Book arguments. Analysis,
66(2):119–127, 2006.
[Bos02a] Nick Bostrom. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Sci-
ence and Philosophy. Routledge, New York, 2002.
[Bos02b] Nick Bostrom. Self-locating belief in big world: Cosmology’s missing
link with observation. Journal of Philosophy, 99(12), 2002.
[Bos07] Nick Bostrom. Sleeping Beauty: A synthesis of views. Synthese,
157(1), 2007.
[Bri10] Rachael Briggs. Putting a value on beauty. In Tamar Szabo Gendler
and John Hawthorne, editors, Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume
3. Oxford, 2010.
48
[Car83] Brandon Carter. The anthropic principle and its implications for
biological evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
of London A, 310:347–363, 1983.
[Cir04] Milan Cirkovic. Agencies, capacities and anthropic self-selection.
Philosophical Writings, 27, 2004.
[CL00] Bradley P. Carlin and Thomas A. Louis. Bayes and Empirical Bayes
Methods for Data Analysis. Chapman, 2000.
[Coz07] Mikal Cozic. Imaging and Sleeping Beauty: A case for double halfers.
In Proceeding of the eleventh conference on theoretical aspects of ra-
tionality and knowledge, 2007.
[Die92] Dennis Diecks. Doomsday or: The dangers of statistics. Philosophical
Quarterly, 42:78–84, 1992.
[DP08] Kai Draper and Joel Pust. Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping
Beauty. Synthese, 164(2), 2008.
[Ega07] Andy Egan. Some counterexampls to causal decision theory. Philo-
sophical Review, 116(1), 2007.
[Elg00] Adam Elga. Self-locating belief and the sleeping Beauty problem.
Analysis, 60(2):143–147, 2000.
[Elg04] Adam Elga. Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 69(2):383–396, 2004.
[Gil89] Margaret Gilbert. On Social Facts. Routledge, 1989.
[Gri84] Patrick Grim. There is no set of all truths. Analysis, 44(4):206–208,
1984.
[Hal04] Joseph Halpern. Sleeping Beauty reconsidered: Conditioning and
reflection in asychronous systems. In Twentieth Conference on Un-
certainty in AI, 2004.
[Har55] John C. Harsanyi. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and inter-
personal comparisons of utility. The Journal of Political Economy,
63(4):309–321, 1955.
[Hit04] Christopher Hitchcock. Beauty and the bets. Synthese, 139(3):405–
420, 2004.
[HM05] Dien Ho and Bradley Monton. Anthropic reasoning does not conflict
with observation. Analysis, 65(1):42–45, 2005.
[Hut04] Marcus Hutter. Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions
Based on Algorithmic Probability. Springer, 2004.
49
[Hut10] Marcus Hutter. A complete theory of everything will be subjective.
Algorithms, 3(4):329–350, 2010.
[Jay03] E. T. Jaynes. Probability Theory, the Logic of Science. Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
[Joy99] James Joyce. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cam-
bridge, 1999.
[Kad04] J. B. Kadane. Stopping to reflect. Journal of Philosophy, 101(6),
2004.
[Kap95] David Kaplan. A problem in possible world semantics. In Wal-
ter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher, editors,
Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Mar-
cus. Cambridge, 1995.
[KM05] Brian Kierland and Bradley Monton. Minimizing inaccuracy for
self-locating belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
70(2):384–395, 2005.
[Les92] J. Leslie. Doomsday revisited. Philosophical Quarterly, 42(166):85–
87, 1992.
[Lew79] David Lewis. Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review,
88:513–543, 1979.
[Lew01] David Lewis. Sleeping Beauty: A reply to Elga. Analysis, 61(3):171–
176, 2001.
[Mea08a] Chris Meacham. Sleeping Beauty and the dynamics of de se belief.
Philosophical Studies, 138(208), 2008.
[Mea08b] Christopher Meachum. Sleeping Beauty and the dynamics of de se
belief. Philosophical Studies, 2008.
[Mos09] Sarah Moss. Updating as communication. In Formal Epistemology
Workshop, June 2009.
[Nea06] Radford Neal. Puzzles of anthropic reasoning resolved using full non-
indexical conditioning, 2006. arXiv:math.ST/ 0608592.
[Olu02] Ken Olum. The doomsday argument and the number of possible
observers. Philosophical Quarterly, 52(207):164–184, 2002.
[Olu04] Ken Olum. Conflict between anthropic reasoning and observation.
Analysis, 64(1):1–8, 2004.
[Pag07] Don Page. Observation selection effects in quantum cosmology, 2007.
arXiv:hep-th/0712.2240.
50
[Pusar] Joel Pust. Conditionalization and essentially indexical credence.
Journal of Philosophy, to appear.
[Sol64] Ray Solomonoff. A formal theory of inductive inference, parts i and
ii. Inform. Contr., 7:1–22 and 224–254, 1964.
[Sus06] Leonard Susskind. The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the
Illusion of Intelligent Design. Back Bay Books, 2006.
[Tit07] Micheal Titelbaum. Quitting Certainties: A Doxastic Modeling
Framework. PhD thesis, Department of Philosopohy, University of
California, Berkeley, 2007.
[Vil95] Andrei Vilenkin. Predictions from quantum cosmology. Physical Re-
view Letters, 74:846–849, 1995.
[vNM44] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton, 1944.
[Whi10] Roger White. Evidential symmetry and mushy credence. In Tamar Sz-
abo Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, Oxford Studies in Episte-
mology Volume 3. Oxford, 2010.
51
